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KTP № 11598 was a public-private research partnership between Lancaster University and
Mitigate Cyber that ran from August 2019–March 2021, part-funded by Innovate UK. The
goal of the partnership was to design and implement a novel IT threat intelligence analy-
sis and quantitative risk calculation tool that would integrate into Mitigate Cyber’s existing
SaaSS platform. Unfortunately, the project was cancelled before it could achieve its goals of
completing a prototype.
This document compiles all of the work completed as part of the project that is suitable
for release into the public domain. Firstly, we detail the findings of a multivocal literature
review into the current state-of-the-art in both threat intelligence and software development.
Secondly, we present the design and implementation work that was completed prior to the
project’s cancellation, including the underlying theory and mathematics. Finally, we list the
development roadmap we had intended to follow prior to the cancellation.
2 Literature Review
This section details some of the results of the first stage of the project: “Investigation &
Understanding”.
We first examine the current state-of-the-art in the field of threat intelligence. We achieve
this via a multivocal literature review (MLR) covering the field of information security threat
intelligence (ISTI) research,1 existing products, relevant insights from the broader security
and intelligence studies literature (including military and law enforcement sources) and a
range of models proposed for each element of the threat intelligence process. From this, we
then propose a framework for threat intelligence and compare these models against it.
Finally, from this we derive a reference architecture for such systems. In line with the ter-
minology from the ISO/IEC 27000-series of standards, we define this system as a threat
intelligence management system (TIMS).
2.1 Legislation and Standards
In this section, we detail the legislative environment in which a TIMS must operate. For
brevity, we consider only legislation applicable within the UK. We then discuss relevant tech-
nical standards and how they may impact on the design of the solution.
2.1.1 Legislation
This subsection describes pieces of legislation that will have to be considered when drafting
the requirements for any TIMS. This includes data protection legislation and information
security regulations.
1We have tried to avoid using terms such as ‘cyber threat intelligence’ throughout the report, in favour of
more precise terminology such as ‘ISTI’. See Andrew Futter, ‘“Cyber” semantics: why we should retire the
latest buzzword in security studies’ (2018) 3(2) Journal of Cyber Policy 201, for further discussion of the issues
with the term ‘cyber’.
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GDPR & DPA 2018
The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was signed into law on 2016-04-14
and came into effect on 2018-05-25. Unlike the previous EU Data Protection Directive,2 the
GDPR was directly enforceable and did not require implementation by Member States in the
form of domestic legislation. The Regulation ‘lays down rules relating to the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and rules relating to the free
movement of personal data.’3
The GDPR defines ‘personal data’ as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (“data subject”)’, ‘processing’ as ‘any operation or set of operations which is
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means,
such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage,...erasure or destruction’ and
a ‘data controller’ as the party which ‘determines the purposes and means of the processing
of personal data’.4 It also defines ‘special category’ personal data, but this is not relevant to
our discussion.
A TIMS would obviously not be much use without customers, so we can assume that any
vendor will have to process and store personally-identifying customer data at the very least.
This will make them the ‘data controller’.
The GDPR lays out the principles relating to the processing of personal data:





(f) integrity and confidentiality; and
(g) accountability.5
Lawfulness, fairness and transparency
Lawful processing is defined in the GDPR as data processing to which ‘at least one of the
following applies’:
(a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal
data for one or more specific purposes;
(b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data
subject is party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject
prior to entering into a contract;
2Directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data 1995-11-23.
3Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection
of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 2016-05-04, art. 1(1).
4ibid art. 4, paras. 1–2 and 7.
5ibid art. 5, paras. 1 and 2.
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(c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the
controller is subject;
(d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data
subject or of another natural person;
(e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the
public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller;
(f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued
by the controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overrid-
den by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject
which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data sub-
ject is a child.6
The GDPR also lays out the data subject’s right to access their personal data and the re-
sponsibilities of the data controller to make information such as their identity and contact
number, the contact details of the data protection office and the legal basis for any proposed
processing clear in advance.7
Purpose limitation
With the exception of archival in the public interest, scientific or historial research or statis-
tical purposes,8 personal data must only be ‘collected for specified, explicit and legitimate
purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes’.
Data minimisation
Personal data must be ‘adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the
purposes for which they are processed’.
Accuracy
Personal data must be ‘accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable
step must be taken to ensure that personal data that are inaccurate, having regard to the
purposes for which they are processed, are erased or rectified without delay’. The data
subject is considered to have rights to both rectification and erasure of their personal data.9
Storage limitation
Again notwithstanding the archival exemption, personal data must be ‘kept in a form which
permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for
which the personal data are processed’. Transfer to countries outside of the UK are limited to
those that have been approved by the Secretary of State.10 Re-identification of anonymised
data is an offence.11
Integrity and confidentiality
Data must be kept secure whether during processing or at rest. This includes ‘protection
against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or dam-
age, using appropriate technical or organisational measures.’
6GDPR, art. 6.
7ibid arts. 12–15.
8Data Protection Act 2018 2018, s. 19.
9GDPR, arts. 16–20.




The GDPR states that, ‘[i]n the case of a personal data breach, the controller shall without
undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it,
notify the personal data breach to the supervisory authority...unless the personal data breach
is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.’12 Infringements
of the GDPR’s provisions, depending on the specific provisions infringed, are ‘subject to
administrative fines up to 20,000,000 EUR [or] up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual
turnover of the preceding financial year, whichever is higher’.13
The Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) serves to ensure that the provisions of the EU’s
GDPR are included in UK law in the event of that country leaving the EU, ‘and applies a
broadly equivalent regime to certain types of processing to which the GDPR does not ap-
ply.’14 The Act covers ‘the processing of personal data’, and is largely a complete transplan-
tation of the GDPR into UK law with additional provisions for matters outside of the scope
of EU law (e.g., national security). However, there are some more subtle differences. For
example, the GDPR states that the age at which a child can consent to data processing is
sixteen, but that ‘Member States may provide by law for a lower age...provided that such
lower age is not below 13 years’15—the DPA 2018 opts for this lower limit.16
Generally, though, differences are minimal; the purpose of the Act is to ensure that the UK’s
data protection laws will be considered ‘adequate’ after leaving the EU, allowing the transfer
of EU citizens’ data to and from the UK.17 Note, also, that the UK’s exit from the EU will not
affect UK businesses’ need to comply with the regulations when operating internationally,
as they apply to anybody who processes the data of EU citizens, regardless of where such
processing occurs geographically.
NIS Directive & NIS Regulations
The Network Information Security Directive (NIS Directive) entered force in mid-2016.18 As
a directive, rather than a regulation, it did not create an enforceable law, but rather directed
all EU Member States to implement it in the form of national laws by mid-2018. The UK duly
issued the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 (NIS Regulations) statutory
instrument, which came into force on 2018-06-20.19
The stated purpose of both the Directive and the Regulations is to ‘[lay] down measures
with a view to achieving a high common level of security of network and information systems
within the Union so as to improve the functioning of the internal market.’20 As a result, the
government was required to designate a number of ‘national competent authorities’,21 a
‘single point of contact on the security of network and information systems’22 and a computer
security incident response team (CSIRT). The national competent authorities vary by sector,
and the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) was appointed as the single point of contact
and CSIRT for the UK.
12GDPR, art. 33(1).
13ibid art. 83(4–5).
14DPA 2018, s. 1(3).
15GDPR, art. 8(1).
16DPA 2018, s. 9(a).
17GDPR, art. 45.
18Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning mea-
sures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union 2016-07-19.
19Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, SI 2004/3166 2018.
20NIS Directive, art. 1, para. 1.
21NIS Regulations, reg. 3.
22ibid reg. 4, r. 1.
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Part 2 of the Regulations serves to identify who the UK government considers to be opera-
tors of essential services (OESs) and digital service providers (DSPs).
The term OES covers:
(a) an entity provid[ing] a service which is essential for the maintenance of crit-
ical societal and/or economic activities;
(b) [where] the provision of that service depends on network and information
systems; and
(c) [where] and incident would have significant disruptive effects on the provi-
sion of that service.23
A DSP is ‘any person who provides: (a) online marketplace; (b) online search engine; (c)
cloud computing service.’24 They are beholden to the Information Commissioner’s Office
(ICO).
Designated competent authorities are responsible for establishing the threshold for essen-
tial services within their sector. Anyone crossing this threshold ‘must notify the designated
competent authority of that fact’.25 A designated authority can also designate organisations
who do not cross the set threshold as OES’ at their discretion.26 In short, the NIS Directive
applies to organisations that are otherwise considered to be part of the country’s critical
national infrastructure (CNI).
Both OES’ and DSPs have a duty to ‘take appropriate and proportionate technical and or-
ganisational measures to manage risks posed to the security of the network and information
systems on which their essential service relies’ and to ‘take appropriate and proportionate
measures to prevent and minimise the impact of incidents affecting the security of the net-
work and information systems used for the provision of an essential service, with a view to
ensuring the continuity of those services.’27 There is also an echo of the GDPR in the form
of a 72-hour window in which the designated competent authority/ICO must be notified of
‘any incident which has a significant impact on the continuity of the essential service which
that OES provides’.28
In the event that the designated competent authority/ICO believes that an OES or DSP has
failed to fulfil their security duties or comply with their notification requirements, they may
issue an enforcement notice against that organisation. Fines to be levied start at a maximum
of £1,000,000 ‘for any contravention which the enforcement authority determines could not
cause a [network and information systems] incident’ up to a maximum of £17,000,000 ‘for
a material contravention which the enforcement authority determines has caused, or could
cause, an incident resulting in an immediate threat to life or significant adverse impact on
the United Kingdom economy.’29
Note that, whilst in the Regulations the obligations and punishments are the same for both
OES’ and DSPs, the Directive does state that ‘[i]n practice, the degree of risk for operators of
23NIS Regulations, art. 5, para. 2.
24ibid reg. 1, r. 2.
25ibid reg. 8, r. 2.
26ibid reg. 8, rr. 3–7.
27ibid reg. 10, rr. 1–2 & reg. 12, rr. 1–2.




Figure 1: PII and personal data comparison.31
essential services, which are often essential for the maintenance of critical societal and eco-
nomic activities, is higher than for digital service providers [and that, t]herefore, the security
requirements for digital service providers should be lighter.’30
As the CNI sector (particularly healthcare) is a key target vertical for most information secu-
rity organisations, the NIS Directive and NIS Regulations will need to be taken into account
in the design of any product for this sector.
2.1.2 Standards
This subsection examines a pair of ISO/IEC standards: ISO/IEC 29100, which outlines a
privacy framework very similar to the GDPR; and the ISO/IEC 27000-series, which describes
how organisations can create and maintain an information security management system
(ISMS). A TIMS would be a good fit within a larger ISMS, so this examination can provide
useful information about the requirements that will be imposed on the system.
ISO/IEC 29100
This standard outlines a privacy framework that echoes many of the principles outlines in the
GDPR above, although there are some key differences. For example, the term personally-
identifiable information (PII) is used throughout in place of personal data, which covers a less
expansive range of data; per the US Government’s Office of Privacy and Open Government:
[t]he term personally-identifiable information refers to information which can be
used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, such as their name, social
security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when combined with other per-
sonal or identifying information which is linked or linkable to a specific individual,
such as date and place of birth, mother’s maiden name, etc.32
To see how this compares with what is covered under the GDPR’s definition of ‘personal
30NIS Directive, recital 49.
32Office of Privacy and Open Government, The, ‘Safeguarding Information’ 〈http://www.osec.doc.gov/opog/
privacy/PII_BII.html〉 accessed 3 December 2019.
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ISO/IEC 29100 principle GDPR principle
Consent and choice Lawfulness, fairness and transparency
Purpose legitimacy and specification Purpose limitation
Collection limitation Purpose limitation
Data minimisation Data minimisation
Use, retention and disclosure limitation Storage limitation
Accuracy and quality Accuracy
Openness, transparency and notice Lawfulness, fairness and transparency
Individual participation and access Lawfulness, fairness and transparency
Accountability Accountability
Information security Integrity and confidentiality
Privacy compliance Lawfulness, fairness and transparency
Figure 2: Alignment of ISO/IEC 29100 and GDPR privacy principles.
Figure 3: Matching ISO/IEC 29100 concepts to ISO/IEC 27000-series concepts.35
data’, see fig. 1.
For an example of an area in which the standard hews more closely to the GDPR, take the
roles set out in § 4.2:
• PII principles, analogous to the GDPR’s data subjects;
• PII controllers, analogous to the GDPR’s data controllers;
• PII processors, analogous to the GDPR’s data processors; and
• Third parties, who will generally ‘become...PII controller[s] in [their] own right[s] once
[they have] received the PII in question.’33
The standard also presents eleven privacy principles,34 which largely overlap with those of
the GDPR (see fig. 2).




Figure 4: ISO/IEC 27000 family of standards.36
As our need to comply with the more demanding GDPR means that we will, as a by-product
also satisfy ISO/IEC 29100, we shall not discuss it further, except to highlight the table in
Annex A of the standard (see fig. 3) which matches ISO/IEC 29100 concepts with those
from the ISO/IEC 27000-series (see fig. 3). As many of these ISO/IEC 29100 concepts have
analogues within the GDPR, this can still be of use to us.
ISO/IEC 27000-series
The ISO/IEC 27000-series of standards, jointly issued by the ISO and IEC, describe the
requirements of an ISMS, which is defined as follows:
An information security management system (ISMS) consists of the policies, pro-
cedures, guidelines, and associated resources and activities, collectively man-
aged by an organization, in the pursuit of protecting its information assets. An
ISMS is a systematic approach for establishing, implementing, operating, moni-
toring, reviewing, maintaining and improving an organization’s information secu-
rity to achieve business objectives. It is based upon a risk assessment and the
organization’s risk acceptance levels designed to effectively treat and manage
risks.37
There are currently 46 standards in the series, covering topics ranging from risk manage-
ment (ISO/IEC 27005) to information security for the healthcare sector (ISO 27799) and
divided into four groups:
• standards describing an overview and terminology (comprising solely ISO/IEC 27000);
• standards specifying requirements;
• standards describing general guidelines; and
• standards describing sector-specific guidelines.
37ISO/IEC 27001:2013: Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management
systems — Requirements (2013) p. 14.
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Fig. 4 illustrates these delineations.
Not all of these standards are relevant to our project. As such, we shall limit our investi-
gation to the ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 documents, along with several guideline
documents. We shall also only be referring to the most current versions of these standards
(e.g., 27001:2013).
ISO/IEC 27001
ISO/IEC 27001’s purpose, as laid out in its introduction, is as follows:
to provide requirements for establishing, implementing, maintaining and continu-
ally improving an information security management system [which] preserves the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information by applying a risk manage-
ment process and gives confidence to interested parties that risks are adequately
managed.38
The document is divided into ten clauses, supplemented by a long annex of controls. The
clauses provide an organisation with guidance on how they could construct and manage
their ISMS, and are as follows:
1. Scope;
2. Normative references;
3. Terms and definitions;





9. Performance evaluation; and
10. Improvement
The standard requires that any organisation’s management ‘demonstrate leadership and
commitment with respect to the information security management system’, through such im-
peratives as ‘ensuring the information security policy and the information security objectives
are established’ and ‘ensuring that the information security management system achieves
its intended outcome(s)’.39 There are also requirements provided for the creation and dis-
semination of information security policies, such as that ‘information security policy shall be
available to interested parties, as appropriate’.40





The latest edition of the standard provides a list of 114 controls, grouped into 14 clauses
and 35 categories, against which any proposed ISMS can be audited. Unlike the previ-
ous 27001:2005 edition, 27001:2013 drops both the emphasis on the Plan-Do-Check-Act
(PDCA) cycle and the requirement that businesses use the controls listed in Annex A of the
standard. Instead, alternate continuous improvement processes and control sets can be
used, at the discretion of the organisation in question.
Guideline Standards
Amongst the various general and sector-specific guidelines, there are a number that may be
of interest to our project.
• ISO/IEC 27002 ‘provides guidance on the implementation of information security con-
trols’;41
• ISO/IEC 27003 ‘provides a process-oriented approach to the successful implementa-
tion of the ISMS in accordance with ISO/IEC 27001’;42
• ISO/IEC 27004 ‘provides guidance and advice on the development and use of mea-
surements in order to assess the effectiveness of ISMS, control objectives, and con-
trols used to implement and manage information security’;43
• ISO/IEC 27005 ‘provides guidance on implementing a process-oriented risk manage-
ment approach’;44
• ISO/IEC 27010 ‘provides guidelines...for implementing information security manage-
ment within information security communities...applicable to all forms of exchange and
sharing of sensitive information, nationally and internationally, within the same indus-
try or market sector or between sectors’45—as a crucial component of an ISTI is the
ability to share information, as highlighted by the heavy focus on this area within the
academic literature, we believe that this standard will be particularly relevant to our
project and deserves further analysis;
• ISO/IEC 27017 ‘gives guidelines for information security controls applicable to the pro-
vision and use of cloud services’;46
• ISO/IEC 27018 provides guidelines for organisations that ‘provide information process-
ing services as PII processors via cloud computing under contract to other organiza-
tions’;47
• ISO/IEC 27799 ‘provides guidelines supporting the implementation of information se-
curity management in health organizations’48—as healthcare is a key target vertical for
most information security organisations, we believe this standard to be relevant.
41ISO/IEC 27000:2016: Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management










ISO/IEC 27000-series and Our TIMS
We believe that a TIMS is a valuable ‘associated resource’, and the process of exploiting
such intelligence is an ‘associated activity’, of a potential customer’s ISMS. We base this
view on the following sections of the ISO/IEC 27001 standard:
• 5.1(c) of the ISO/IEC 27001 standard requires that ‘top management shall demonstrate
leadership and commitment with respect to the ISMS by...ensuring that the resources
needed for the ISMS are available’;49
• 5.1(d) requires that they ‘communicat[e] the importance of effective information secu-
rity management’;50
• 6.1.2 requires that an organisation ‘define and apply an information security risk as-
sessment process that...identifies the information security risks[,] analyses the informa-
tion security risks [and] evaluates the information security risks’, which clearly requires
some form of threat intelligence to perform effectively;51
• 7.3(c) requires that ‘people doing work under the organization’s control shall be aware
of...the implications of not conforming with the ISMS requirements’;52 and
• 7.4 requires organisations to ‘determine the need for internal and external communi-
cations relevant to the ISMS’.53
In addition, should a vendor wish to include their software projects within the scope of an
organisational ISO/IEC 27001 certification, any TIMS must both fit into a potential customer’s
ISMS and fulfil the vendor’s own responsibilities.
As previously mentioned, ISO/IEC 27010 provides guidelines for applying ISO/IEC 27001
within information sharing communities. This can present difficulties, as ‘part of the mem-
ber organization will be within scope of the community ISMS and part will be outside’ and
‘members of the information sharing community may have their own information security
management systems and, in consequence, some processes might fall within scope of both
the community and members’ management systems.’54
The standard describes sensitive communications in terms of three participants:
• the source of an item of information, who ‘does not need to be a member of the com-
munity’;
• the originator, who initiates the distribution within the community, who ‘may, but need
not be, the same as the source of the information’ and who ‘may conceal the identity
of the source’; and
• the recipient(s) who receive the information distributed within the community, but who
do not need to be members of the community.55





54ISO/IEC 27010:2015: Information technology — Security techniques — Information security management




The guidelines augment a few of the controls listed in ISO/IEC 27001, for example by high-
lighting that ‘[i]nformation provided by other members of an information sharing community
is an asset’ and should be treated as such and that information classification should also
take into account credibility and priority.56 It also introduces an additional control objective to
clause 8 (asset management) aimed at providing information exchange protection, such as
by ensuring source anonymity and displaying information disclaimers to recipients.57
Interestingly, the guidelines also state that ‘[i]nformation sharing communities should con-
sider implementing alternative mechanisms for information sharing that do not rely on elec-
tronic messaging, and enabling members to specify that specific messages are distributed
by such other routes.’58
§ 8.4.7 addresses the onward release of received information, citing the Traffic Light Protocol
(TLP) as an option for ‘indicat[ing] how information can be further distributed without seeking
additional approval’.59 The Protocol is described in Annex C of the standard.60 ‘The TLP
is based on the concept of the originator labelling information with one of four colours to
indicate what further dissemination, if any, can be undertaken by the recipient’—the colours
used in the standard are:
• RED - Personal for Named Recipients Only;
• AMBER - Limited Distribution;
• GREEN - Community Wide; and
• WHITE - Unlimited (subject to standard copyright rules).61
The standard also states that ‘[a]ll sensitive information will be deemed to be AMBER unless
otherwise stated or written’, however ‘the identity of the source of the sensitive information
will always be RED.’62
ISO/IEC 27017 addresses the use of cloud services, on the basis that ‘[t]he provision and
use of cloud services is a kind of supplier relationship, where the cloud service customer is
an acquirer, and the cloud service provider is a supplier’ and so clause 15 applies. It then
provides implementation guidance for each control in Annex A, as well as a few additional
ones, for both the cloud service customer and the cloud service provider.
Appendix A lists all of the ISO/IEC 27000-series controls that we believe to be relevant to
this project.
2.2 Current State-of-the-Art
This section presents a multivocal literature review (MLR) of the contemporary state of the
ISTI research field and market. First, we review the academic literature to present a top-level
view of the state-of-the-art. Secondly we assess the current state of the ISTI market. Thirdly,
we detail a range of potential data sources that an TIMS may choose to leverage.










MLRs are a subset of systematic literature reviews (SLRs), which originated within the med-
ical sciences, but which were introduced to the software engineering literature in the mid-
2000s.63 MLRs have begun to spread further within the information technology (IT) research
community, including at least one paper on ‘cyber’ threat intelligence,64 but adoption is cur-
rently limited.
The goal of an MLR is to conduct a literature review that encompasses both the academic
literature and the ‘grey literature (GL)’ (alternatively ‘practitioner’ or ‘non-academic literature’)
in a structured way that can account for the potential shortcomings of the latter. A set of
guidelines exist for conducting MLRs in software engineering, which we find can apply to
our own project without amendment.65
The methodology we have used for our MLR, adapted from,66 is as follows:
1. Identify any existing reviews and plan/execute the MLR to explicitly provide usefulness
for its intended audience.
2. Justify the decision to include the GL in the review.
3. Based on the research goal and target audience, define the research questions (RQs)
(and be explicit about the type of each RQ).
4. Identify the relevant GL types and/or producers for the review.
5. Establish stopping criteria for your search.
6. Define the source inclusion/exclusion criteria.
7. Search for sources, up to the established stopping criteria.
8. Filter the sources by the established inclusion/exclusion criteria.
9. Perform quality assessment of the remaining sources, using a formal quality assess-
ment checklist for GL sources. Establish a threshold for inclusion and filter out those
sources that fall below this.
10. Extract data from the remaining sources.
11. Perform data synthesis on the extracted data.
12. Write a report on your review for the intended audience(s).
63Vahid Garousi, Michael Felderer, and Mika V Mäntylä, ‘Guidelines for including grey literature and con-
ducting multivocal literature reviews in software engineering’ (2019) 106 Information and Software Technology
101, p. 1.
64Clemens Sauerwein and others, ‘Threat intelligence sharing platforms: An exploratory study of software
vendors and research perspectives’ [2017] .





This subsection covers the current state-of-the-art within the academic and the grey ISTI
literature. It begins with a brief look into the wider intelligence studies literature, followed
by a meta-review of previously-published ISTI reviews and ending with coverage of various
proposed models for various sub-areas of ISTI.
Within the world of IT, threat intelligence is a relatively new field. Elmellas describes it
‘c[oming] to prominence in the mid-2000s as a solution to analysing and filtering data about
emerging threats from several sources in real time to address the ever-increasing cyberthreat
landscape.’67 As shown in fig. 7, whilst there has been an explosion in activity within the field
in recent years, this has not been reflected in the rate of academic publication. As such,
there are few existing reviews of the literature and many of these reviews focus only on one
sub-problem, such as threat intelligence sharing. For example, the Cyber Security Body of
Knowledge (CyBoK) devotes only a single section to the topic, briefly discussing the use
of honeypots and the definition of indicators of compromise (IoCs) whilst again focusing
primarily on information sharing.68
Intelligence Studies
The field of intelligence studies (IS) is concerned with how the intelligence process operates
in the abstract. Whilst it is not directly applicable to much of ISTI, there is still value in
examining the findings of this field; not least of which is the fact that it represents many
decades more research than does ISTI.
Gill and Phythian provide a comprehensive survey of the history of IS.69 The authors define





They then trace the historical development of the field of IS in various countries, from the
predominantly historical ‘British school’ that ‘reflects not just the strength of the British com-
munity of historians but also that the two twentieth-century world wards provided much of
the original raw material, as the strength of official secrecy ensured little on peacetime in-
telligence emerged before the 1990s and made the study of contemporary intelligence de-
velopments almost impossible’ to the US IS community’s greater focus on the definitional
and organisational aspects—‘more ink has probably been spilt on the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) than on any other agency in the world’, the authors write.70
The authors define ‘intelligence’ as:
67Jamal Elmellas, ‘Knowledge is power: the evolution of threat intelligence’ (2016) 2016(7) Computer Fraud
& Security 5, p. 5.
68Hervé Debar, Security Operations & Incident Management (, CyBoK 2019) p. 28.




Figure 5: The intelligence cycle.72
the mainly secret activities – targeting, collection, analysis, dissemination and ac-
tion – intended to enhance security and/or maintain power relative to competitors
by forewarning of threats and opportunities.71
Traditionally, the process of creating intelligence has been described as the ‘intelligence
cycle’.73 This circular model (see fig. 5) comprises the following stages:
1. Planning and direction, which covers ‘management of the entire effort, from identifying
the need for data to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer’;
2. Collection, or ‘the gathering of the raw information needed to produce finished intelli-
gence’;
3. Processing, in which ‘the vast amount of information collected [is converted into] a form
usable by analysts through decryption, language translations, and data reduction’;
4. Analysis, or ‘the conversion of basic information into finished intelligence’; and
5. Dissemination, ‘the distribution of the finished intelligence to the consumers’ (and
‘ which logically feeds into the first’).
As Gill and Phythian write, however, ‘in recent years the utility of the concept of the intel-
ligence cycle has been called into question’.74 Hulnick suggests that ‘the cyclical pattern
does not describe what really happens’, as ‘[p]olicy officials rarely give collection guidance[,
c]ollection and analysis...in fact work more properly in parallel [and] the idea that decision
71Peter Gill, ‘Theories of intelligence: Where are we, where should we go and how might we proceed?’ in
Intelligence Theory: Key Questions and Deabtes (Routledge 2008) p. 214.
73CIA, The Intelligence Cycle (2001).
74Gill and Phythian (n ??) p. 12.
15
PUBLIC Section 2
Figure 6: The intelligence process.76
makers wait for the delivery of intelligence before making policy decisions is equally incor-
rect.’75 In addition, the intelligence cycle ‘fails to consider either counter-intelligence or covert
action.’
Gill and Phythian propose the model of the ‘funnel of causality’ (see fig. 6) as better capturing
‘dynamic nature of intelligence’s impact on the external environment’.77 The model builds on
earlier work by Wittkopf, Jones, and Kegley Jr.78
Others propose the Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse and Disseminate (F3EAD) model
more commonly used in military and counterterrorism operations.79 This model extends the
intelligence process to include actions resulting from the findings80—what Gill and Phythian
refer to as ‘power’, contrasting it with ‘knowledge’.81
The F3EAD model comprises the following steps:
1. Find, where a target is identified (using the five ‘W’s—‘who, what, when, where, why’);
2. Fix, where the previously-identified target is verified;
3. Finish, where will is imposed on the target;
4. Exploit, where evidence generated by the Finish phase is deconstructed;
75Arthur S Hulnick, ‘What’s wrong with the Intelligence Cycle’ (2006) 21(6) Intelligence and national Security
959.
77Gill and Phythian (n ??) pp. 13–14.
78Eugene R Wittkopf, Christopher M Jones, and Charles W Kegley Jr, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and
Process (Cengage Learning 2007).
79Wilson Bautista Jr, Practical cyber intelligence: how action-based intelligence can be an effective response
to incidents (Packt Publishing Ltd 2018) p. 122.




Figure 7: Trend of ‘threat intelligence’ in ‘cyber activity’, 2006–2016.82
5. Analyse, where the evidence thus generated is incorporated into the wider intelligence
picture; and
6. Dissemination, where the results are published.
Whilst this model may have utility in the study and planning of offensive information security
operations, such as the identification and breaking-up of organised malware gangs, we do
not believe it is relevant to the vast majority of TIMS’. Only a very small minority of organi-
sations, either state or commercial, will have the interest in thoroughly investigating attacks
for attribution, and even fewer of these will be able to impose their will on the targets when
identified; these are usually limited to state intelligence or policing agencies, but even they
are often impotent in the face of trans-jurisdictional attacks.
As a result, we believe that the intelligence funnel concept provides the best way of thinking
about general ISTI, and as such is the most useful model to apply to the design of our own
TIMS.
Meta-review
The most comprehensive survey paper of the field of ISTI as a whole that we found is Tounsi
and Rais’. The authors lament that ‘few researches have been done to examine and identify
characteristics of ISTI and its related issues’, identifying that ‘a significant body of work has
been dedicated to threat intelligence sharing issues [whilst] in contrast, less research has
been devoted to areas like technical threat intelligence (TTI) problems and how to mitigate
them.’84
The authors divide ISTI into four sub-domains:
• strategic threat intelligence, high-level information consumed by decision-makers;
• operational threat intelligence, information about specific impending attacks consumed
by higher-level security staff;
84Wiem Tounsi and Helmi Rais, ‘A survey on technical threat intelligence in the age of sophisticated cyber
attacks’ (2018) 72 Computers & security 212, p. 216.
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Figure 8: Reasons not to share TI data.83
• tactical threat intelligence, information about how threat actors are conducting attacks
consumed by incident responders; and
• technical threat intelligence, information normally consumed through technical resources.85
Strategic and tactical threat intelligence are identified for long-term use, whilst operation and
technical threat intelligence are for short-term or immediate use. The authors also identify
ten key reasons for organisations not to share ISTI data with one another; see fig. 8.
We found a number of reviews of specific areas of ISTI. Fachkha and Debbabi survey the
use of darknet—‘traffic targeting advertised, but unused, Internet Protocol (IP) addresses’—
and honeypot monitoring in collecting ISTI, bolstered by case studies of various worms and
botnets.86
Within the most heavily-researched area of ISTI sharing, Burger and others present a five-
layer taxonomy for classifying exchange technologies (see fig. 9) whilst Sauerwein and oth-
ers found that a standardised format for representing ISTI is currently lacking (whilst they do
accept that Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX™) appears to be the de facto
standard, ‘most platforms do not fully utilize its descriptive capabilities’), that most existing
TIMS’ are closed-source, that the research focus is on data collection rather than data anal-
ysis and that the degree of automation currently on offer is insufficient. Burger and others
Wagner and others provide a comprehensive survey of the state of ISTI sharing technologies
currently existing. They again highlight the need for more automation, writing that ‘current
sharing methods are heavily based on manual input and therefore labor intensive.’ They also
identify three common sharing models: peer to peer; peer to repository; and hybrid, which
combines the previous two models. They offer eleven characteristics of actionable ISTI (see
fig. 10) as well as an overview of the regulations surrounding ISTI sharing, emphasising
the need for international alignment as ‘cyber attacks do not know any borders, therefore,
CTI sharing should ideally not be impeded by various country regulations’. Interestingly, the
85Tounsi and Rais (n 84) p. 215.
86Claude Fachkha and Mourad Debbabi, ‘Darknet as a source of cyber intelligence: Survey, taxonomy, and
characterization’ (2015) 18(2) IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 1197.
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Figure 9: Five-layer taxonomy of ISTI exchange technologies.87
Figure 10: Characteristics of actionable ISTI.88
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Figure 11: The primary dimensions of information sharing.89
Figure 12: Knowledge areas covered by different existing ISTI sharing standards.91
authors warn that ‘it may become obligatory for organizations to have a threat intelligence
program...and share their information [with] stakeholders...held responsible in the future for
not sharing known threats that affected others and results in a breach.’ Unfortunately, this
appears to be conjecture on the part of the authors and no evidence is provided in support
of the claims.90
Skopik, Settanni, and Fiedler describe information sharing in terms of five primary dimen-
sions (see fig. 11) and elaborate on each, addressing key legislation such as the EU’s NIS
Directive and the US’ White House Executive Order (EO) 13636 and Presidential Policy Di-
rective (PPD) 2192 as well as standardisation efforts. They also highlight the knowledge
areas covered by existing ISTI sharing standards (see fig. 12), demonstrating a lack of any
fully-comprehensive alternative at present.93
90Thomas D Wagner and others, ‘Cyber threat intelligence sharing: Survey and research directions’ (2019)
87 Computers & Security 101589.
92NIS Directive; White House, The, Executive Order – Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (2013);
Presidential Policy Directive – Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 2013.
93Florian Skopik, Giuseppe Settanni, and Roman Fiedler, ‘A problem shared is a problem halved: A survey




On the business side, Sauerwein, Sillaber, and Breu found that phenomenon of ‘shadow
IT’—whereby day-to-day business operations are managed using IT products and services
that are not explicitly approved or supported by the business—extends into the field of ISTI,
with most professionals surveyed indicating that they regularly receive ISTI from sources
that ‘bypass security and risk management review processes or formal approval structures’
and which is then often disseminated internally. A key motivation for this was identified as
a concern for the timeliness of information, with ‘almost half of the (shadow) cyber threat
intelligence sources...accessed on a daily basis, or instantaneous’.94
Highlighting the value of including GL in our MLR, a number of reports and whitepapers
exist detailing the field from a market perspective. Bromiley divides ISTI into the high-level
categories of ‘internal’ and ‘external’, emphasising that ‘true ISTI harmony exists when an
organization uses both sources simultaneously’ and providing a series of steps for making
ISTI actionable:
• incorporating ISTI into an organization’s security posture;
• using ISTI to help drive investigations and response;
• using ISTI to look into the past and possibly see things that were missing in the ab-
sence of the ISTI; and
• using ISTI to look into the future.95
Meanwhile, Brown and Lee found that the use of ISTI is growing, more organisations are
consuming ISTI and ‘information-sharing programs have value beyond just the information
that is being shared.’96 The findings echo those of Shackleford, who found that out of 326
qualified survey respondents, ‘69%...report[ed] implementing CTI to some extent, with only
16% saying they ha[d] no plans to pursue CTI in their environments.’97 Brown and Lee also
echo Sauerwein and others in suggesting there is a need for more automation, which they
propose will allow ‘organizations to better allocate resources and give analysts more time to
focus on analysis and dissemination of intelligence, rather than on collection and processing
of data.’
Finally, Falk categorises ISTI programmes in terms of maturity: aware; reactive; adaptive;
purposeful; and strategic. The author also describes the idea of Threat Intelligence-as-a-
Service (TIaaS).98
2.2.3 Market Research
Market research carried out by Gartner found that ‘the term “threat intelligence” covers a
diverse set of capabilities’, and that this ‘diversity of threat intelligence (TI) services, as well
94Clemens Sauerwein, Christian Sillaber, and Ruth Breu, ‘Shadow cyber threat intelligence and its use
in information security and risk management processes’ [2018] Multikonferenz Wirtschaftsinformatik (MKWI
2018).
95Matt Bromiley, ‘Threat intelligence: What it is, and how to use it effectively’ [2016] SANS Institute InfoSec
Reading Room.
96Rebekah Brown and Robert M Lee, ‘The Evolution of Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI): 2019 SANS CTI
Survey’ [2017] SANS Institute InfoSec Reading Room.
97Dave Shackleford, ‘Who’s using Cyberthreat Intelligence and how?’ [2015] SANS Institute.
98Courtney Falk, Cyber Threat Intelligence as a Service (2017).
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Figure 13: Methods to define and select an ISTI provider.100
Figure 14: Three things to do well to achieve value from ISTI.101
as expertise, [has] created an environment in which purchasers often struggle to compare
services, and there’s still no single provider to address all of them.’ The authors predict that
‘[b]y 1010, 20% of large enterprises will use commercial TI services to inform their security
strategies’, compared to ‘fewer than 10% today.’99
The report authors define TI as follows:
TI products and services provide knowledge about information security threats
and other security-related issues. TI can provide information about the identities,
motivations, characteristics and methods of threat actors.
However, they add that it is ‘hard to pin down, in terms of a market definition,...what cleanly
defines the types of solutions in this market.’ TI can be both the main element of a product or
service offering, or ‘a feature of something larger’ such as an enhancing element of a firewall
or managed security service (MSS). These additional features, the authors write, ‘should [be]
treat[ed] as a differentiator for procuring and operating these products and services.’
99Craig Lawson, Ryan Benson, and Ruggero Contu, Market Guide for Security Threat Intelligence Products
and Services (, Gartner 2019).
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The authors of the report highlight two distinct approaches within the ISTI market:
• vendors who ‘generate their own content, or, alternatively, provide what we consider to
be original and substantial enrichment or aggregation of content harvested from other
sources that has specialized analysis applied to it’; and
• vendors which a ‘aggregate information from other sources and possibly add some
metadata that they generate or is enriched by accessing other third parties’, whose
‘value is in stitching it all together to provide a cohesive outcome’.
They also distinguish between ‘machine-readable TI (MRTI)’ and ‘TI geared at people’.
There is a shift underway in terms of who uses ISTI programs; whilst ‘TI services appeal pri-
marily to large enterprises that have significant brand presence or higher-risk profiles, and
generally have security organizations with more-mature security programs...some service
providers are expanding their focus to include mid-size organizations and have been pursu-
ing this objective for several years by providing pre-packaged, easier-to-consume offerings
at lower price points into a range of technologies and maturity levels.’
The report provides five methods that prospective ISTI product or service purchaser can
use to determine the best option for their situation (see fig. 13). From the perspective of a
service provider, the same methods can be used to choose which qualities to target with
their offering, as we shall do later.
Finally, the report lists a number of providers and divides them into which of Gartner’s three
requirements for effective ISTI they most represent (see fig. 14):
• those that acquire intelligence (e.g., BAE Systems Applied Intelligence, CrowdStrike,
etc.);
• those that aggregate intelligence (e.g., LookingGlass, ThreatConnect, etc.); and
• those that action intelligence (though the authors write that ‘this is often embedded in
[a] product or service itself’).
2.2.4 Data Sources
There are many possible sources of data that an TIMS can call upon. However, more of-
ten than not they are heterogeneous and must be normalised if they are to be usefully
processed; ‘this normalization of disparate data sources is an extremely prosaic type of
challenge, yet it is a sticking point that bungs up the works over and over again.’103
Data sources can be categorised along three dimensions: locus; structure; and trust.
Locus
A data source can be internal, such as the results of a penetration test or an internal intrusion
detection service (IDS), or external, such as a public vulnerability database or a security
researcher’s blog. Whether a source is internal or external is unlikely to impact on whether it



















Figure 16: Categorisation of data sources.
is structured or unstructured, but it is very likely that internal sources will be inherently more
trusted than external sources.
Structure
Some data sources are published in a structured format, such as the STIX™ for threat
intelligence or the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) for vulnerabilities. Others
are unstructured, such as blog posts and news articles. All data must be normalised before
it can be usefully processed, and both structured and unstructured data can pose a problem
here: unstructured data as it must have structure imposed on it, and structured data as it
may need to be restructured if the TIMS uses a different approach.
Trust
Most important, perhaps, is the level of trust granted to a given data source. Fig. 15 shows
the ‘shades of grey’ that can be applied when considering grey literature for inclusion in a
multi-vocal literature review, and the same approach should be applied to ISTI data sources.
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Less trusted sources should not necessarily be excluded, as they may still contain use-
ful information that cannot be found elsewhere (as even an outright lie by an attacker can
have criminological value104). However, this untrustworthiness should be made clear to all
consumers of the data.
Trustworthiness can be affected by many factors: the perceived expertise of the source’s
author; a prior record of integrity; the presence of conflicts of interest; and so on. Note,
however, that trust is not the same thing as certainty, which should also be made clear but
relates to the perceived probability of an event occurring; see Kent.105
Fig. 16 shows the mapping of a number of data sources along these three axes: the level
of trust increases left-to-right; the level of structure increases bottom-to-top; and the locus
of the data is encoded as either red (for internal sources) or blue (for external). A truly
comprehensive TIMS will have to utilise a wide range of different types of sources, but must
consider the relative issues of each.
2.3 TIMS Reference Architecture
This section describes the reference architecture for a prospective threat intelligence man-
agement system (TIMS), based on our review of the academic literature, legislation and
international standards.
2.3.1 TIMS Classification








As we have discussed, there are multiple competing proposals for modelling the intelligence
cycle. However, we prefer the ‘funnel of causality’ suggested by Gill and Phythian (see
§ 2.2.2 and fig. 6). Marinos and Lourenço also offer a detailed map of ISTI programs, di-
vided into strategic, tactical, technical and operational areas and the governance, collection,
production and dissemination steps of the intelligence cycle (see fig. 17).
104Sveinung Sandberg, ‘What can “lies" tell us about life? Notes towards a framework of narrative criminology’
in Advancing Qualitative Methods in Criminology and Criminal Justice (Routledge 2014).
105Sherman Kent, ‘Words of estimative probability’ [1964] .
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Figure 17: ISTI representation.106
Figure 18: Detection Maturity Level model.107
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Stillions proposed an eight-level Detection Maturity Level (DLM) model of ISTI solutions,108
to which Bromander, Jøsang, and Eian added a ninth.109 The levels of the model (see fig. 18)
are as follows:
0. None or Unknown. There is no [Incident Response] team, or they are
totally clueless.
1. Atomic IoCs. These are elementary pieces of host & network artifacts,
which might have been received from other parties. The value of atomic
IoCs is limited due to the short ‘shelf life’ of this type of information.
2. Host & Network Artifacts. This is the type of information which can be
collected by network and endpoint sensors.
3. Tools. Attackers install and use tools within the victim’s network...DML-3
means that the defender can reliably detect the attacker’s tools, regardless
of minor functionality changes to the tool...
4. Procedures. Detecting a procedure means detecting a sequence of two or
more of the individual steps employed by the attacker.
5. Techniques. Techniques are specific ways of executing single steps of an
attack.
6. Tactics. To detect a tactic means to understand how the attack has been
designed and executed in terms [of] the techniques, procedures and tools
used.
7. Strategy. This is a non-technical high-level description of the planned at-
tack.
8. Goals. The motivation for the attack can be described as a goal.
9. Identity. The identity of the attacker, or the threat agent, can be the name
of a person, an organisation or a nation state.110
Automation
Sauerwein and others and Brown and Lee both highlight the need for additional automation
within available ISTI solutions.
NB: The remainder of this sub-section was not completed.
2.3.2 Architecture
Menges, Sperl, and Pernul attempt to unify the language and models used to describe
ISTI into a single meta model (fig. 20), intended to provide ‘a comprehensive specification,
covering both the basic structuring elements and coherences that can be used to express
intelligence information.’113 Citing Burger and others, the authors state that ‘basic CTI objects
can be assigned to the three different categories Indicator, Intelligence and Attribution’:114
108Ryan Stillions, ‘The DML Model’ (2014) 〈https://ryanstillions.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-dml-model_21.
html〉 accessed 25 November 2019.
109Siri Bromander, Audun Jøsang, and Martin Eian, ‘Semantic Cyberthreat Modelling.’ (2016).
110ibid pp. 75–76.




Figure 19: ISTI model.111
Figure 20: ISTI meta model.112
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Figure 21: Unified notation for threat intelligence.118
• ‘Indicator objects describe patterns or behaviours that show the likelihood than an
incident is occurring, has already occurred or will probably occur in the future’;115
• ‘Intelligence objects are used to represent specific knowledge about threats or inci-
dents’;116 and
• ‘Attribution objects describe the source, the target as well as the circumstances of an
incident.’117
Following this, they construct a unified element notation by analysing the terms used by dif-









– (Impact) Assessment; and
– Campaign.
• Intelligence:
– Course of Action; and
– Incident.
Finally, they use this model and notation to develop a unified data model for representing ISTI
(fig. 22). This model divides the ten entities into three layers, aligned with the classifications
presented in the unified notation, as well as including various entity relationships and values





Figure 22: Unified ISTI data model.121
(where the ‘e_’ prefix denotes a public enumeration, ‘s_’ denotes a scoring system and ‘v_’
denotes a vocabulary or private enumeration). Menges, Sperl, and Pernul do not intend this
model to be final, but rather aim to expose areas for future development; for example, they
propose ‘[o]ne possible extension [to the Asset entity] would be an additional scoring system
to evaluate the criticality of the assets’,119 citing Kim and Kang.120
2.4 Software Development Practices
This section discusses contemporary software development practices. Beginning with an
overview of the lean movement, we then describe various lightweight, iterative software de-
velopment movements—Extreme Programming (XP), Agile, DevOps, etc.—and their relative
pros and cons. We then examine the ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207 standard for software lifecycle
process, and how it can be applied to agile approaches. We conclude by detailing the soft-
ware development methodology to be used in the duration of this project.
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Figure 23: The Build-Measure-Learn feedback loop.122
2.4.1 Lean Thinking
‘Lean thinking’ was coined in 1996 to describe the ideas underpinning the greatly influen-
tial Toyota Production System.123 The term ‘lean’ refers to the idea of an organisation or
process stripped of all superfluity and healthier for it; critics accuse lean of prioritising cost-
cutting above all other considerations, though this can perhaps more accurately be called
‘emaciated thinking’.
Lean thinking considers a organisation or process in terms of:
• value;
• value streams (i.e., ‘the process required to convert a business hypothesis into a
technology-enabled service that delivers value to the customer’124); and
• flow.
The ultimate goal of a lean organisation or process is to minimise obstacles and friction to
maximise the rate of flow through the defined value streams, with a subsequent increase in
the value produced for customers. Note that in lean thinking, customers can be both internal
and external to the organisation—a downstream operations team is considered a customer
of an upstream software development team just as much as the customer who eventually
hands over money for the finished product.
119Menges, Sperl, and Pernul (n ??) p. 172.
120Anya Kim and Myong H Kang, Determining asset criticality for cyber defense (techspace rep, US Naval
Research Laboratory 2011).
123James P Womack and Daniel T Jones, Lean thinking: banish waste and create wealth in your corporation
(Second, first published 1996, Free Press 2003).
124Gene Kim and others, The DevOps Handbook: How to Create World-Class Agility, Reliability, and Security
in Technology Organizations (IT Revolution 2016) p. 8.
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Figure 24: The Three Ways.126
Ries applies lean thinking to the running of a ‘lean startup’, with a ‘startup’ defined by the
author as ‘a human institution designed to create a new product or service under conditions
of extreme uncertainty.’125 Note that this definition need not refer to a startup company, and
the book is replete with examples of startups operating within larger organisations.
The core tenets of the lean startup idea are rapid experimentation, regular reassessment
and pervasive monitoring. ‘Because startups often accidentally build something nobody
wants, it doesn’t matter if they do it on time and on budget’, writes the author. ‘The goal of a
startup is to figure out the right thing to build—the thing customers want and will pay for—as
quickly as possible.’127 Key to this is the Build-Measure-Learn feedback loop (see fig 23) and
the lean startup’s goal of minimising the time taken to complete each cycle of the loop—this
same idea is described by Kim as the ‘Three Ways’ (see fig. 24).128
1. flow;
2. feedback; and
3. continual learning and experimentation.129
The startup will have a vision—where it views itself after the success it believes to be pos-
sible. ‘The first step would be to break down the grand vision into its component parts.’130
This vision will, by virtue of the uncertainty inherent in being a startup, contain a number
of leap-of-faith assumptions (e.g., ‘customers will want to use this service’, ‘people who
like the product will tell their friends’, etc.), the two most important of which are the value
hypothesis—‘whether a product or service really delivers value to customers once they are
125Eric Ries, The Lean Startup: How Constant Innovation Creates Radically Successful Businesses (Portfolio
Penguin 2011) p. 27.
127ibid p. 20.
128Gene Kim, The Three Ways: The Principles Underpinning DevOps, ‘IT Revolution’ (2016).
129Kim and others (n ??) pp. 11–13.
130Ries (n 125) p. 61.
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using it’—and the growth hypothesis—‘how new customers will discover a product or ser-
vice’. Vital at this early stage is to ‘...identify the elements of the plan that are assumptions
rather than facts, and figure out ways to test them.’131
Ries describes three engines of growth that a startup may focus on:
• the sticky engine of growth, which relies on improving the customer retention rate;
• the viral engine of growth, which relies on increasing the number of new customers
each customer introduces to the produce; and
• the paid engine of growth, which relies on increasing the margin between the value of
a customer and the cost of acquiring them.132
Once the likely engine of growth and other hypotheses underpinning the vision are identi-
fied, the startup should build a Minimum Viable Product (MVP)—the most minimal product
possible that can be used to validate or disprove the initial assumptions underlying the cur-
rent strategy. Examples techniques include the concierge MVP in which the needs of early
adopters are focused on in a way that would be impossible to scale and Wizard of Oz testing
in which customers believe they are interacting with an automated system that is in fact hu-
man operated. This allows them to rapidly move from the Build phase of the feedback loop
to the Measure phase.
The MVP will be a far cry from the startup’s vision, but this is by design. ‘Failure is a prereq-
uisite to learning. The problem with the notion of shipping a product and then seeing what
happens is that you are guaranteed to succeed—at seeing what happens. But then what?
As soon as you have a handful of customers, you’re likely to have five opinions about what
to do next. Which should you listen to?’133 Between receiving customer feedback from early
adopters and monitoring various metrics that will allow them to validate or disprove their hy-
potheses, the startup can receive rapid feedback on each change they make to the product
and identify cause and effect, focusing their efforts on those changes that tune their chosen
engine of growth and leaving those that do not.
When the startup reaches the point in which they have exhausted the product changes they
can use to tune their engine of growth, they must decide whether to pivot or persevere. They
may have found through testing that their initial hypotheses were incorrect—perhaps their
customers, though satisfied with the product, do not tell their friends as expected, in which
case the viral engine of growth may not be appropriate. Or they may have made progress
from their initial MVP, but not as fast as they believe they should be. Perhaps they have
experienced substantial progress, but are afraid they have only achieved a local maxima
and that greater progress is available elsewhere.
Ries identifies various different types of potential pivot:
• the zoom-in pivot, in which a sub-feature of the product becomes the new focus;
• the zoom-out pivot, in which the product becomes a sub-feature of a larger product;
• the customer segment pivot;





Figure 25: The Vision-Strategy Product pyramid.134
• the customer need pivot, in which the need the product aims to satisfy is changed;
• the platform pivot, shifting from an application to a platform or vice versa;
• the business architecture pivot, shifting from high volume-low margin to low volume-
high margin or vice versa;
• the value capture pivot, changing the way the startup captures the value they create
(e.g., their revenue model);
• the engine of growth pivot;
• the channel pivot; and
• the technology pivot.135
‘The sign of a successful pivot is that these engine-tuning activities are more productive after
the pivot than before.’136 The theory is that by rapidly optimising the product and occasionally
pivoting the strategy, the startup will converge more rapidly on a product that fulfils their
original vision (see fig. 25).
2.4.2 Extreme Programming
Extreme Programming (XP) is a software development methodology primarily developed
by Beck in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The ‘Extreme’ in the title refers to the goal of
the method, which is to take those elements of software development commonly viewed as
beneficial to the extreme.
Similar to the lean movement, the focus of XP is to minimise the time taken for developers
to receive feedback on their code. XP endorses five key values:









These values are underpinned by various rules, which are designed to be interdependent
and which serve to codify some aspects of lean thinking. Different sets of rules exist, but
some examples include:
• a stand up meeting starts each day;
• code the unit test first;
• never add functionality early;
• the customer is always available; and
• integrate often.137




(c) test-driven development; and
(d) whole team.
2. Continuous process:
(a) continuous integration, or constantly merging new code into the main branch;




(b) collective code ownership;




Whilst XP was influential at the turn of the century, it was criticised in some quarters for
being overly prescriptive and requiring unrealistic levels of discipline from implementers.
137Don Wells, The Rules of Extreme Programming (1999).





The Manifesto for Agile Software Development was issued in 2001 and signed by a multiple
influential software developers, including Beck.139 The manifesto identified four dichotomies
within software development and expressed the signatories’ belief that ‘while there is value
in the items on the right we value the items on the left more’; the items are:
• Individuals and Interactions over processes and tools;
• Working Software over comprehensive documentation;
• Customer Collaboration over contract negotiation; and
• Responding to Change over following a plan.140
Similarly to XP, the Manifesto also codified twelve principles:
1. satisfy the customer through early and continuous delivery of valuable software;
2. welcome changing requirements, even in late development;
3. deliver working software frequently;
4. business people and developers must work together daily throughout the project;
5. build projects around motivated individuals...and trust them to get the job done;
6. the most efficient and effective method of conveying information...is face-to-face con-
versation;
7. working software is the primary measure of progress;
8. the sponsors, developers, and users should be able to maintain a constant pace indef-
initely;
9. continuous attention to technical excellence and good design;
10. simplicity—the art of maximizing the amount of work not done—is essential;
11. the best architectures, requirements, and designs emerge from self-organizing teams;
and
12. at regular intervals, the team reflects on how to become more effective, then tunes and
adjusts its behaviour accordingly.
Agile is often mistaken as a specific method of software development, rather than an overar-
ching philosophy that is realised through various methods (e.g., Scrum). A useful metaphor
is provided by Littlefield:




A good analogy would be the difference between a recipe and a diet. A veg-
etarian diet is a set of methods and practices based on principles and values. A
recipe for chickpea tacos would be a framework you can use to implement your
vegetarian diet.
This is similar to the relationship between Agile (the diet) and Scrum (the
recipe you follow).141
The complete list of methods and frameworks considered to be Agile is too long to list here.
Instead, we shall now go through each principle of the Manifesto and explain how it can be
adhered to within a project, highlighting along the way a few popular methods and frame-
works.
1. Satisfy the customer through early and continuous delivery of valuable software.
As many of the processes standing between a developer writing code and a customer re-
ceiving it should be automated as possible. There are three levels of this automation:
1. continuous integration, in which developers commit new code to the master code
branch regularly (at least once per day);
2. continuous delivery, in which code is shown to be a deployable at all times, but deploy-
ment to production is still manual; and
3. continuous deployment, in which the deployment to production is automated.
Obviously, successfully implementing continuous methods requires discipline from develop-
ers and comprehensive automated testing suites. One cannot jump to continuous delivery
or deployment in one go.
However, one can begin with something like do-nothing scripting, which will highlight areas
of potential automation along with delivering immediate benefits in the form of process stan-
dardisation and error avoidance. Gradually, these processes can become more and more
automated.142
At the same time, continuous integration can and should be implemented as soon as pos-
sible. Developers having to regularly commit their code to master encourages them to shift
into working in smaller, more incremental chunks.
2. Welcome changing requirements, even in late development
In order to ensure the the project is reactive to changing requirements, development must
be broken into small intervals. At the end of each interval, the results should be assessed
and customers consulted to ensure that any requirement changes can be incorporated into
planning at the earliest possible stage. One such method of iterative development is Scrum.
Scrum originated in a 1995 paper as a project management framework built around small
teams breaking their work down into short iterations (called ‘sprints’), tracking their progress
and feeding the results back into the planning of future iterations.143 The authors of that
paper now maintain The Scrum Guide, a de facto official guide to the method.144
141Andrew Littlefield, The Beginner’s Guide to Scrum and Agile Project Management (2016).
142Dan Slimmon, Do-nothing scripting: the key to gradual automation (2019).
143Ken Schwaber, ‘SCRUM Development Process’ (Cory Sutherland Jeff and Casanave and others eds,
Springer London 1997).




Figure 26: Ideal and non-ideal testing pyramids.146
The Scrum framework defines three roles:
• the product owner, who represents the product’s stakeholders, has final say on backlog
prioritisation and is ultimately responsible for project results;
• the development team, ideally formed of three to nine members who decide upon the
technical solution to the business problems posed by the product owner and build
features during sprints; and
• the Scrum Master, who removes obstacles to delivery and facilitates the Scrum pro-
cess.
When a new feature proposal arises, the product owner will write a customer-focused ticket
(e.g., by creating a user story) and add it to the product backlog. When a sprint is planned, a
goal is set and relevant items moved from the product backlog to the sprint backlog. A sprint
should ideally be between one week and one month long, with the emphasis on valuable,
useful output—see the below definition of ‘done’:
At the end of each development interval, we must have integrated, tested,
working, and potentially shippable code, demonstrated in a production-like envi-
ronment, created from trunk using a one-click process, and validated with auto-
mated tests.145
At the end of the pre-assigned duration for the sprint, the team finish their work regardless
of whether the goal has been achieved or not. A sprint is held in which the team review
the work they have completed and not completed, present the work to stakeholders and
begin planning the next sprint. This is followed by a sprint, in which the team reflect on the
previous sprint and identify areas where processes could be improved. For example, if the
sprint completed with many unfinished tasks, the team may take this into account by being
more realistic in the planning of their next sprint.
3. Deliver working software frequently.
145Kim and others (n ??) p.149.
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In Scrum, only features that can be shown to be working—i.e., ‘done’, as per the definition
above—can be shown to stakeholders at the sprint. For continuous delivery or deployment
to be possible, comprehensive automated test suites are needed. These tests should be
performed in ascending order of time taken to complete—quick automated unit tests first,
followed by slower automated component, integration and Application Programming Inter-
face (API) testing, followed by even slower automated Graphical User Interface (GUI) tests
and only reaching the final, labour-intensive round of manual testing if the build has passed
all previous stages (see fig. 26).147
One way of ensuring comprehensive test coverage is to employ Test-Driven Development
(TDD). This can be summed up in three steps:
1. Ensure the tests fail. Write a test for the next bit of functionality you want to add. Check
in.
2. Ensure the tests pass. Write the functional code until the test passes. Check in.
3. Refactor both new and old code to make it well structured. Ensure the tests pass.
Check in again.148
Nagappan and others found that for teams using TDD ‘the pre-release defect density of the
four products decreased between 40% and 90% relative to similar projects that did not use
the TDD practice’, with the teams experiencing only ‘15–35% increase in initial development
time after adopting TDD’.149
4. Business people and developers must work together daily throughout the project.
The DevOps (and, subsequently, DevSecOps) movement is focused on breaking down bar-
riers to communication between different groups within your organisation in the interest of
reducing siloisation and promoting skill transfer and cross-communication. The movement
originally focused on harmonising the daily work of development and operations teams, the
latter of which could be considered ‘business people’. DevOps is not, as Kim and others
stress, about ‘the complete elimination of the IT Operations function’; rather, it is about
‘enabl[ing] developer productivity through APIs and self-serviced platforms that create en-
vironments, test and deploy code, monitor and display production telemetry, and so forth’
with the result that ‘IT Operations become more like Development (as do QA and Infosec),
engaged in product development, where the product is the platform that developers use to
safely, quickly, and securely test, deploy and run their IT services in production.’150
One advancement that has helped enable these developments is the shift to Infrastructure
as Code (IaC), where configuration settings for product infrastructure are stored in machine-
readable formats (e.g., YAML files) and checked into version control alongside the product
code. This ensures that environments can be easily spun up and down on-demand by devel-
opers, settings consistency can be guaranteed across multiple instances and IT Operations
gain experience in using the same tools as developers. Similarly, some organisations (e.g.,
Google) require developers to self-manage their production services until it operates within
certain non-functional parameters before it can be passed on to the IT Operations team, who
147Kim and others (n ??) pp. 123–141.
148ibid pp. 134–135.
149Nachiappan Nagappan and others, ‘Realizing quality improvement through test driven development: re-
sults and experiences of four industrial teams’ (2008) 13 Empirical Software Engineering 289.
150Kim and others (n ??) p. xvi.
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reserve the right to hand it back to the developers in future should performance degrade sig-
nificantly.151
5. Build projects around motivated individuals...and trust them to get the job done.
Kim and others write that one way ‘...to enable high-performing outcomes is to create stable
service teams with ongoing funding to execute their own strategy and road map of initiatives.’
They advocate ‘fund[ing] not projects, but services and products’, with the goal of ‘valu[ing]
the achievement of organizational and customer outcomes, such as revenue, customer life-
time value, or customer adoption rate, ideally with the minimum of output’.152
The point about trusting employees to get the job done brings up the question of working
practices. Despite many organisations having policies on remote working and the like, these
are often treated in practice as more of a privilege that is granted rather than a right that
is exercised. There is substantial evidence in favour of remote working, suggesting bene-
fits ranging from productivity increases, improved workforce diversity, increased employee
retention, better employee mental health and supporting family relationships.153
6. The most efficient and effective method of conveying information...is face-to-face
conversation.
‘As organizations grow, one of the largest challenges is maintaining effective communication
and coordination between people and teams...Collaboration is...impeded...when teams are
separated by contractual boundaries, such as when work is performed by an outsourced
team.’154 Note, however, that ‘face-to-face’ does not necessarily have to mean in-person—
instant messaging and video conferencing are workable substitutes. One tool commonly
deployed in support of this Agile principle is the daily stand-up meeting in which all devel-
opers start the day by briefly telling the team what they worked on yesterday, what they will
work on today and any obstacles they expect to encounter. Insisting that participants stand
up is intended to help keep the meetings short, as is the prohibition of longer discussions—
where these are necessary, those who need to discuss are expected to arrange a separate
meet-up between themselves.
7. Working software is the primary measure of progress.
This principle captures the idea that judging project success by how on-time or within-budget
it currently is does not provide useful information as to whether the idea itself is sound. It
is not possible to perform user research without working software, and ‘if we are not per-
forming user research, the odds are that two-thirds of the features we are building deliver
zero or negative value to our organisation, even as they make our codebase ever more com-
plex, thus increasing maintenance costs over time and making our software more difficult
to change. Furthermore, the effort to build these features is often made at the expense of
delivering features that would deliver value (i.e., opportunity cost).’155
8. The sponsors, developers, and users should be able to maintain a constant pace
indefinitely.
Agile is opposed to the late nights, enforced overtime and end-of-project ‘crunch time’ that
151Kim and others (n ??) p. 234–240.
152ibid p. 87.
153Nicholas Bloom and others, ‘Does working from home work? Evidence from a Chinese experiment’ (2014)
130(1) The Quarterly Journal of Economics 165; Owl Labs, State of Remote Working 2019 (, Owl Labs 2019);
Jobsite, The rise of women in technology (2017); Adrianne Bibby, 17 Stats About Remote Work in 2019 (2019).




characterise many other software development projects, perhaps most notoriously within
the computer game industry.156 It aspires to creating a pace of development that, whilst still
challenging the team, is sustainable in the long-term.
Kanban is one method of balancing customer demand and team capacity in project manage-
ment. Tasks to complete are visualised, most commonly via sticky notes on a whiteboard
that is visible at all times. The whiteboard is divided into buckets; for example, ‘backlog’,
‘working on’, ‘testing’, ‘deployment’ and ‘delivered’. Tasks are moved across the board as
they complete each stage, making their way towards the final state on the right-hand side.
This allows the team and other stakeholders to see, at a glance, the progress of different
features and the current capacity of the team to take on additional tasks.
An important feature of Kanban is the maximum limit for each bucket. Once a bucket is full
of tasks, no new ones can be assigned until space is cleared up by moving existing tasks
to later buckets. This both ensures that the team are never operating above capacity and
helps to quickly identify potential bottlenecks, where process improvements can be focused.
For example, if the ‘deployment’ bucket is routinely holding up tasks, it may be that too many
levels of approval are required or the process could be further automated.
9. Continuous attention to technical excellence and good design.
As previously mentioned, a vital part of lean thinking is measuring and learning. Telemetry
should be collected for all features—‘if it was important enough for an engineer to implement,
it is certainly important enough to generate enough production telemetry so that we can
confirm that it is operating as designed and that the desired outcomes are being achieved.’157
Detailed user metrics should be recorded to allow for more valuable forms of analysis—
cohort analysis is a far more powerful tool than simple gross or cumulative numbers, for
example.
All metrics must satisfy the three ‘A’s:
• Actionable (i.e., must demonstrate clear cause and effect);
• Accessible (i.e., everyone must be able to access them from a centralised repository);
and
• Auditable (i.e., must be backed up with real-world tests to ensure correctness).
For example, cohort testing can show how many of the visitors to a produce Web site in a
given month ultimately convert into paying customers (e.g., the sales funnel). This can then
be used to compare the results of an A/B test of two different pricing strategies or Web site
layouts to establish a cause and effect relationship.
Modern monitoring architecture must feature two elements:
• data collection at the business logic, application, and environments layer; and
• an event router responsible for storing our events and metrics.158
156Tim Surette, EA settles OT dispute, disgruntled “spouse" outed, ‘GameSpot’ (2006); Rockstar Spouse,
Wives of Rockstar San Diego employees have collected themselves, ‘Gamasutra’ ; Jason Schreier, Inside
Rockstar Games’ Culture Of Crunch, ‘Kotaku’ .




The benefits of pervasive monitoring go beyond just fault detection. For example, Jacobson,
Yuan, and Joshi presents the example of Netflix’s predictive traffic scaling engine, which
identifies usage patterns in previously-recorded traffic data and scaling their servers up and
down appropriately.159
An important Agile concept is the information radiator—any number of highly-visible displays
that allow everybody to see at a glance any key metrics about a product, such as uptime or
usage patterns. ‘We want to make as much infrastructure telemetry visible as possible,
across all the technology stakeholders, ideally organized by service or application. In order
words, when something goes wrong with something in our environment, we need to know
exactly what applications and services could be or are being affected.’160 This should also
include security metrics: ‘by radiating how our services are being attacked in the produc-
tion environment, we reinforce that everyone needs to be thinking about security risks and
designing countermeasures in their daily work.’161
10. Simplicity—the art of maximizing the amount of work not done—is essential.
In its most obvious incarnation, this principle drives the mentality within Agile of ‘automate
all the things’. Any process that can be automated, should be. This can apply to testing, to
deployment, to monitoring, to alerting, etc. The principle also underlines the notion of the
MVP and rapid experimentation within lean startup theory—work performed on the basis
of an untested assumption should be minimised, and additional time and resources should
only be committed once the initial assumption(s) seem to be validated.
11. The best architectures, requirements, and designs emerge from self-organizing
teams.
Team structure can have an impact on their resulting software; Conway’s law states that
‘organizations which design systems...are constrained to produce designs which are copies
of the communication structures of these organizations.’163 Teams should ideally be provided
with the autonomy to determine their own priorities and plans: ‘[a] way to enable high-
performing outcomes is to create stable service teams with ongoing funding to execute their
own strategy and road map of initiatives [and] the dedicated engineers needed to deliver on
concrete commitments made to internal and external customers, such as features, stories
and tasks.’164
On the topic of architectures, Shoup describes three archetypes, which are summarised
in fig. 27.165 Micro-services are also referred to as Service-Oriented Architectures (SOAs):
‘The idea is that developers should be able to understand and update the code of a service
without knowing anything about the internals of its peer services. Services interact with their
peers strictly through APIs and thus don’t share data structures, database schemata, or
other internal representations of objects.’166
12. At regular intervals, the team reflects on how to become more effective, then
tunes and adjusts its behaviour accordingly.
159Daniel Jacobson, Danny Yuan, and Neeraj Joshi, Scryer: Netflix’s predictive auto scaling engine, ‘Netflix
Technology Blog’ (2013).
160Kim and others (n ??) p. 212.
161ibid p. 327.
163Melvin E Conway, ‘How do committees invent’ (1968) 14(4) Datamation 28.
164Kim and others (n ??) p. 87.
165Randy Shoup, ‘From the Monolith to Microservices: Lessons from Google and eBay’ (2016) vol 2016.
166Kim and others (n ??) p. 89.
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Figure 27: Architectural archetypes.162
The notion of technical debt, or the gradual accrual of workarounds, good-enoughs and
bodge jobs that are the avoidable side-effect of any software development is important to
lean thinking. Like financial debt, technical debt must be regularly paid down with scheduled
improvement blitzes—periods of time dedicated solely to the improvement of processes and
workarounds. A common figure is that this should amount to 20% of the development time
(i.e., every fifth sprint should be an improvement blitz).167
On a larger scale, Dekker describes the idea of a ‘just culture’ as one that accepts that
‘human error is not our cause of troubles; instead, human error is a consequence of the
design of the tools we gave them’.168 Kim and others describe two practices that can help to
create a just culture:
• blameless post-mortems; and
• the controlled introduction of failures into production.
The blameless post-mortem should occur following a significant incident such as a customer-
affecting bug or a deployment failure, as soon as possible once the issue has been resolved
in order to ensure memories are fresh and cause and effect can be established. The steps
are as follows:
1. construct a timeline;
2. empower all engineers to improve safety by allowing them to give detailed accounts of
their contributions to failures;
167Kim and others (n ??) pp. 299–303.
168Sidney Dekker, Just Culture: Balancing safety and accountability (CRC Press 2016).
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3. enable and encourage people who do make mistakes to be the experts who educate
the rest of the organisation on how not to make them in future;
4. accept that there is always a discretionary space where humans can decide to take
action or not, and that the judgement of those decisions lies in hindsight; and
5. propose countermeasures to prevent a similar accident from happening in the future.169
Attending the post-mortem should be everyone involved in the decisions that contributed
to the incident, those who identified, responded to, diagnosed and were affected by the
problem and anyone else who is interested. The timeline should be supported with evidence
(e.g., emails, chat logs) where possible, and the post mortem report should be offered to the
rest of the organisation in an accessible place in the event of similar issues in future. The
blamelessness is vital: ‘when engineers make mistakes and feel safe when giving details
about it, they are not only willing to be held accountable, but they are also enthusiastic in
helping the rest of the company avoid the same error in the future. This is what creates
organizational learning.’170
Controlled failure introduction, on the other hand, ensures that issues that are at risk of
happening at some point (e.g., server loss) do not have to be waited on, but rather simulated
in a controlled manner and lessons learned immediately. Kim and others cite a number of
examples, such as Netflix’s Chaos Monkey program which randomly kills processes running
in production and the use of pre-planned Game Days to simulate a major issue (be it an
Amazon Web Services (AWS) outage or an alien invasion).
2.4.4 ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207
The ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207 standard was first introduced in 1995, and was most recently
revised in 2017.172 Prior to this revision it was known as just ISO/IEC 12207.
The standard presents a set of processes ‘from which an organization can construct software
life cycle models appropriate to its products and services.’173 As such, it is intended to be
framework-, life cycle model- and technique-agnostic.
The standard divides its thirty processes into four process groups (see fig. 28):
1. Agreement processes:
(a) Acquisition process; and
(b) Supply process.
2. Organizational Project-enabling processes:
(a) Life Cycle Model Management process;
(b) Infrastructure Management process;
(c) Portfolio Management process;
169Kim and others (n ??) pp. 274–275.
170ibid p. 274.




Figure 28: ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207 software life cycle processes.171
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(d) Human Resource Management process;
(e) Quality Management process; and
(f) Knowledge Management process.
3. Technical Management processes:
(a) Project Planning process;
(b) Project Assessment and Control process;
(c) Decision Management process;
(d) Risk Management process;
(e) Configuration Management process;
(f) Information Management process;
(g) Measurement process; and
(h) Quality Assurance process.
4. Technical processes:
(a) Business of Mission Analysis process;
(b) Stakeholder Needs and Requirements Definition process;
(c) Systems/Software Requirements Definition process;
(d) Architecture Definition process;
(e) Design Definition process;







(m) Maintenance process; and
(n) Disposal process.
We shall now provide a brief overview of each process group.
Agreement Processes
The standard states that ‘[t]he Agreement processes are organizational processes that apply
outside of the span of a project’s lifespan, as well as for a project’s lifespan.’174 They can be
considered meta-processes, which set the terms of engagement between producers and
users of a system and lead to its creation.
Organisational Project-Enabling processes
174ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2017 (n 172) p. 21.
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These processes ‘are concerned with providing the resources to enable the project to meet
the needs and expectations of the organization’s stakeholders.’ They ‘establish the environ-
ment in which projects are conducted.’175
Technical Management processes
Processes within this group ‘are concerned with managing the resources and assets allo-
cated by organization management and with applying them to fulfil...agreements.’176 Note
that, again, these processes cover the full life cycle of the software, from planning to quality
assurance (which, depending on the development methodology used, my take place at the
start and finish of the project, respectively, or continuously throughout).
Technical processes
These are the processes that ‘transform the needs of stakeholders into a product or service.’
In short, they bring the goods. Unlike the other process groups, ‘[t]he Technical processes
are applied in order to create and use a software system.’177
As previously mentioned, the standard is intended to be methodology-agnostic. As such,
there is no problem integrating it with agile methodologies such as Scrum, as discussed
in Annex H of the standard and by Irrazabal and others (although there in terms of the
ISO/IEC 12207:2008 revision of the standard).178 Though ‘the life cycle models used in agile
projects are often highly incremental and evolutionary...organizations that use agile methods
do apply the life cycle processes identified in this document’.179
Appendix B details how each process will be implemented for this project.
2.4.5 Proposed Development Methodology
The key words ‘MUST’, ‘MUST NOT’, ‘REQUIRED’, ‘SHALL’, ‘SHALL NOT’, ‘SHOULD’,
‘SHOULD NOT’, ‘RECOMMENDED’, ‘MAY’, and ‘OPTIONAL’ in this document are to be
interpreted as described in RFC 2119.180
For the remainder of this Knowledge Transfer Partnership (KTP), development shall adhere
to the Agile philosophy, implemented in practice through use of the following techniques and
rules:
• Scrum SHALL be used for project planning and time management.
– Sprints SHOULD be two weeks long.
– Occasionally longer or shorter sprints MAY be needed, but these MUST be no
longer than one month and no shorter than one week.
– If the number of longer or shorter sprints reaches 20 % of overall sprints, the
default timeframe SHOULD be reviewed.
– There SHOULD be one (and only one) Product Owner per project who has ulti-
mate decision-making authority for that project.
175ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2017 (n 172) p. 22.
176ibid p. 22.
177ibid p. 22.
178Emanuel Irrazabal and others, ‘Applying ISO/IEC 12207: 2008 with SCRUM and Agile methods’ (2011).
179ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2017 (n 172) p. 127.
180Scott Bradner, Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels (1997).
47
PUBLIC Section 2
– There SHOULD be at least one Scrum Master for all project teams.
– A single Development Team SHOULD NOT exceed nine members.
– If there is only one Scrum Master, they SHOULD NOT also be a Product Owner.
However, this MAY be the case where it is unavoidable.
– If there are two or more Scrum Masters, a Scrum Master SHOULD NOT be as-
signed to a project where they are also Product Owner.
– In a project team of two or more members, the Product Owner SHOULD NOT be
part of the Development Team.
– All sprints MUST begin with a planning session.
– All sprints MUST end with a sprint retrospective.
– All sprints SHOULD end with a sprint review.
– Tasks SHOULD be formulated as user stories by the Product Owner.
• Kanban boards SHALL be used for capacity management.
– These boards MAY be physical (e.g., whiteboards and sticky notes) or MAY be
virtual (e.g., Trello).
– Only a Product Owner SHOULD be able to add tasks to the product backlog.
– The buckets used SHOULD be as follows:
1. ‘Ready’, for completed user stories;
2. ‘Investigate’, for user stories being converted into feature specifications;
3. ‘Develop’, for features being developed from specifications;
4. ‘Test’, for developed features being tested;
5. ‘Deploy’, for features that have passed their tests and need to be deployed;
and
6. ‘Delivered’, for features that have been delivered to customers.
– With the exception of the ‘Ready’ and ‘Delivered’ buckets, bucket capacity SHOULD
be capped at the number of developers on the project.
– The ‘Investigate’ bucket capacity SHOULD be twice the number of developers.
– Tickets MUST be able to move both left or right on the board.
• Continuous deployment SHALL be used for all development.
– Test-Driven Development MUST be used for all feature development.
– If test coverage is ever less than 85 % of the codebase, the next sprint SHOULD
be devoted to test-writing.
– All developers SHOULD commit their code to main at least once per day.
– Where the use of branches is unavoidable, developers MUST squash and rebase
their changes before merging with main.
– Where a commit causes production to fail, the developer responsible MUST im-
mediately attempt to resolve the issue.
– If, after one minute, the issue is not resolved, the rest of the Development Team
MUST stop what they are doing and work on the issue until it is resolved.
• Telemetry SHALL be created by all features and environments.
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– If monitoring coverage is ever less than 85 % of the codebase, the next sprint
MUST be devoted to adding telemetry.
– Production environments MUST produce telemetry.
– Development and staging environments SHOULD produce telemetry.
• A just culture MUST be created and maintained.
– A blameless post-mortem MAY be scheduled after any incident.
– A blameless post-mortem MUST be scheduled following an incident that results
in any of the following:
* production experiencing more than five minutes of downtime;
* a MUST rule stated here being broken;
* complaints from more than one customer;
* an inability to deliver new code to customers;
* a financial loss to the company; or
* damage to the company’s reputation.
– A blameless post-mortem SHOULD be scheduled within one week of the incident
being resolved.
– A blameless post-mortem MUST NOT take place more than three weeks after the
incident is resolved.
– A blameless post-mortem SHOULD include:
* the people involved in decisions that may have contributed to the problem;
* the people who identified the problem;
* the people who responded to the problem;
* the people who diagnosed the problem;
* the people who were affected by the problem; and
* anyone else who is interested in attending.
– Blameless post-mortem reports MUST be accessible by other employees and any
customers affected by the incident.
– Blameless post-mortem reports SHOULD be made public.
– Production failures SHOULD be injected unpredictably, to ensure the resilience of
the system.
– All projects SHOULD schedule a Game Day at least once every six months.
• These are default settings. All project teams SHOULD review and MAY amend these
as they see fit, but MUST explicitly record justification for their changes and, where
possible, back their decisions up with data.
As said, this is the methodology that shall be used for the development of this KTP’s threat
intelligence solution. Pre-existing projects (i.e., brown field projects) may find some elements
prohibitively difficult to implement. These teams are free to hew as close or as far to this
structure as they like, but are nonetheless advised to begin planning their transitions towards
Agile development practices as soon as possible.
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Figure 29: How often organisations have experiences breaches or attacks experiences in
the last 12 months.184
3 ISTI Design
This section summarises some of the design and implementation decisions that went into
the development of this project’s prototype TIMS, prior to its unexpected cancellation.
3.1 Theory
Theoretically, this sprint formalised the mathematical underpinning for the planned risk cal-
culation feature.181 This mathematical underpinning shall now be described in detail: first,
how to calculate the likelihood of an attack/breach; second, how to calculate the cost; and
third, how to apply both of those to a given business to provide an actionable calculation of
risk. The methodology is not perfect, but it suffices for the purposes of proof-of-concept.
For demonstration purposes, we decided to use the 2020 edition of the UK government’s
Cyber Security Breaches Survey (CSBS) as our first source of TI data.182
3.1.1 Likelihood
The CSBS does not provide data individual responses; only aggregate data. For example,
fig. 29 shows the answers to ‘How often organisations have experiences breaches or attacks
experiences in the last 12 months’, categorising the 748 respondents’ answers as: ‘only
once’; ‘less than once a month’; ‘once a month’; ‘once a week’; ‘once a day’; ‘several times
a day’; and ‘don’t know’.
This presents an obstacle to the goal of creating a log-normal distribution of breach fre-
quency. However, we can approximate this distribution, as breach statistics follow a Pareto
distribution. First, we define the aforementioned categories numerically (adding one for
‘none’ and dropping the ‘don’t know’ response):
181This was aided by a statistician colleague of DP’s (Chris Sherlock, Dan data (28 October 2020)).
182Department of Digital, Media, Culture & Sport and Matt Warman, ‘Cyber Security Breaches Survey 2020’




CategoriesTextual = (None,annually, < monthly,monthly,weekly,daily, > daily) (1)
CategoriesNumeric = (0, 1, 2–11, 12, 52, 365, > 365) (2)
Then, we can make some reasonable assumptions about the actual numbers covered by
some of the categories. For example, we can assign 2–8 as the range covered by ‘less than
once a month’, assuming that more than 8 breaches in a year would likely be remembered
as ‘monthly’. Similarly, we can assign the range 9–18 to ‘once a month’ as respondents with
13–18 breaches might round down from ‘once a week’.
This gives us the following boundaries, choosing an arbitrary maximum of 8,000 (i.e., 21/day):
Boundaries = (1, 2, 8, 18, 80, 400, 8000) (3)
We can then insert the values from the CSBS (where 54 % of respondents reported no
breaches)185, giving us
Probabilities = (0.1058, 0.1012, 0.0966, 0.069, 0.0368, 0.0414) (4)









0 x < b.
(5)
and therefore, for x ≥ b






log (1− F (x)) = α log b− α log x (7)
Plotting this (see fig. 30) shows us that we have a (roughly) straight line to fit.
Having plotted a linear model based on this, we can then run a number of simulations using
the below formula (where u is a uniform random number)
185Whilst 1,348 UK organisations responded to the CSBS, and 620 (46 %) reported having identified breaches
or attacks in the last 12 months ((Department of Digital, Media, Culture & Sport and Warman [n ??] fig. 5.1)),
the frequency question is apparently based on the responses of 748 organisations (i.e., 121 % of those report-
ing breaches). We have chosen to apply the percentages from the frequency question to the numbers from
the overall question (i.e., 23 % of 46 % of businesses—12.43 %–reported one breach in the last 12 months).
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On an example run of 10,000 iterations, this produced the below probability distribution (with
the CSBS distribution and difference for comparison)
ProbabilitiesCalculated = (0.1067, 0.1457, 0.0627, 0.0718, 0.0410, 0.0479) (9)
ProbabilitiesCSBS = (0.1058, 0.1012, 0.0966, 0.069, 0.0368, 0.0414) (10)
Difference = (−0.0158, 0.0009, 0.0445,−0.0339, 0.0028, 0.0042, 0.0065) (11)
µ (Difference) = 0.001 (12)
Rounding the random numbers down, we can then plot a histogram of the number of attacks
(see fig. 31).
3.1.2 Costs
In terms of calculating the cost of each breach, the CSBS provides the average cost of all
breaches identified in the last 12 months (and the average cost of only those breaches with
an outcome),186 and then delves into the average direct, recovery and long-term cost fig-
ures.187 However, these breakdown figures are only for what the respondents have identified




Figure 31: Generated attacks histogram.
as the ‘most disruptive’ breach or attack they have experienced in the last 12 months. This
poses us the challenge of deriving from these figures the likely per-breach direct, recovery
and long-term cost probability distributions.
For now, though, we can stick to the first set of data: the average cost of all breaches that
led to an outcome.
To plot a log-normal distribution, we need to have the mean (µ) to position the centre of the
curve and the standard deviation (σ) to determine its width. The CSBS provides us with the
mean, and we can use these along with the median (µ 1
2











σ = eln(σ) (14)
So, with the mean cost of £3,230 and the median of £274 from the CSBS, we can calculate
that
µ = 3230 (15)
σ = 9.219401 (16)
ln(µ) = 8.080237 (17)
ln(σ) = 2.22131 (18)
From this, we can generate a probability density distribution (see fig. 32).
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Figure 32: Generated average cost distribution.
3.1.3 Monte Carlo Simulation
Finally, we can use our likelihood and cost values to run a Monte Carlo simulation. This
involves simulating n organisations over 12 months, choosing a random number of attacks
for each run based on the likelihood distribution. For each attack, we than calculate a cost
from the cost distribution, summing them to give us the total cost to the organisation for that
year.
Let l = number of attacks distribution (19)
Let c = cost distribution (20)
L ∼ l (21)





We can plot the density of the results of this simulation as a line (see fig. 34) or a histogram
(see fig. 33).
We can compare the results of this simulation to the actual average cost figures given in the
CSBS for all breaches over the last 12 months (i.e., including ones without an outcome):
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Figure 33: Monte Carlo simulation results density.
µMonte Carlo = £1004.58 (24)
µ 1
2
Monte Carlo = £0 (25)
µCSBS = £1010 (26)
µ 1
2
CSBS = £0 (27)
3.1.4 Loss Exceedance
Finally, we can use these simulation results to produce a loss exceedance curve (LEC) for
the organisation. This allows them to specify a cost amount and calculate what the chances
of them them hitting or exceeding it over the next 12 months. For example, fig. 35 shows
such a curve, given a maximum cost value of £2,500.
3.2 Pre-Cancellation Plan
After a lengthy suspension due to the COVID-19 pandemic, we devised a new set of deliver-
ables that would take us through to the end of the project and deliver a strong basis for further
development. Unfortunately, the project was cancelled shortly afterwards, so we were never
afforded the opportunity to fulfil these ambitions. However, they detail the methodology we
had intended to use and may be of some use in the development of future systems.
The project milestones were identified, along with their achievement dates, as follows:
1. By the end of Dec 2020 we should have: a system that can run generic Monte Carlo
simulations and determine baseline LECs for organisations; recalculating them both
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Figure 34: Monte Carlo simulation results histogram.
on-demand and at scheduled points to ensure that they always reflect the latest and
most-specific information available; and implement a method and workflow by which
employees can record new items of ISTI to be included in those calculations, subject
to approval.
2. By the end of Mar 2021, we should have: initial, empirical evidence for the effectiveness
of three controls tied to other products and services (e.g., e-learning, penetration tests,
Cyber Essentials (CE) certification); conducted expert surveys and identified additional
data sources to supplement the CSBS; conducted controlled A/B trials using real users.
3. By the end of May 2021, we should have: much more details simulation results, which
take into account the impacts of an organisation’s implemented controls (derived from
an asset log), their characteristics (e.g., size, industry, etc.) and the likelihood of spe-
cific types of breach.
4. By the end of Jul 2021, we should have: the ability to perform rudimentary ‘what if?’
analysis, provided predictive return on investment (RoI) values for new controls and
recommending the most effective controls to consider next.
5. By the end of Sep 2021 (i.e., the end of the project), we should have: the produced
system documented and handed over for future development.
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Figure 35: Monte Carlo simulation results loss exceedance.
A Relevant ISO/IEC 27000 Controls
This appendix features all of the ISO/IEC 27000-series controls that we consider to be rele-
vant to the design of our TIMS. Those that would have to be implemented at company-level
(e.g., much of clause 5) have been elided, although these may come with obligations for our
project (e.g., ISO/IEC 27010 augments control 5.1.1 to highlight the need for ‘[a]n informa-
tion sharing policy [that] should define how the community members will work together to set
security management policies and direction for the information sharing community’188).
Unless otherwise specified, all controls below are from Annex A of the ISO/IEC 27001:2013
standard.189
5 Information security policies
5.1 Management direction for information security
Objective: To provide management direction and support for information security in
accordance with business requirements and relevant laws and regulations.
188ISO/IEC 27010:2015 (n 54) p. 4–5.







An information sharing policy should define
how the community members will work
together to set security management policies
and direction for the information sharing
community. It should be made available to all
employees involved in information sharing
within the community. The policy may restrict
its dissemination to other employees of
community members.190
The information sharing policy should define
the information marking and distribution rules
used within the community.191
7 Human resource security
7.2 During employment








All employees of the organization and, where
relevant, contractors shall receive appropriate
awareness education and training and
regular updates in organizational policies and
procedures, as relevant for their job function.
8 Asset management
8.1 Responsibility for assets
Objective: To identify organizational assets and define appropriate protection
responsibilities.







Information, other assets associated with
information and information processing
facilities shall be identified and an inventory
of these assets shall be drawn up and
maintained.
The cloud service customer’s inventory of
assets should account for information and
associated assets stored in the cloud
computing environment.192
The inventory of assets of the cloud service
provider should explicitly identify: cloud





Assets maintained in the inventory shall be
owned.
8.1.3 Acceptable use of
assets
Control
Rules for the acceptable use of information
and of assets associated with information
and information processing facilities shall be
identified, documented and implemented.
Information provided by other members of an
information sharing community is an asset
and should be protected, used and
disseminated in accordance with any rules
set by the information sharing community or
by the originator.194
8.2 Information classification
Objective: To ensure that information receives an appropriate level of protection in




Information shall be classified in terms of
legal requirements, value, credibility, priority,
criticality and sensitivity to unauthorised
disclosure or modification.195
See ISO 27799 for discussion of the flexibility
needed to accommodate personal health
information classification.196
192ISO/IEC 27017:2015: Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for information
security controls based on ISO/IEC 27002 for cloud services (2015) p. 7.
193ibid p. 7.
194ISO/IEC 27010:2015 (n 54) p. 6.
195ISO/IEC 27010:2015 (n 54) p. 6.







An appropriate set of procedures for
information labelling shall be developed and
implemented in accordance with the
information classification scheme adopted by
the organisation.
The cloud service customer should label
information and associated assets
maintained in the cloud computing
environment in accordance with the cloud
service customer’s adopted procedures for
labelling.197
The cloud service provider should document
and disclose any service functionality it
provides allowing cloud service customers to





Procedures for handling assets shall be
developed and implemented in accordance
with the information classification scheme
adopted by the organisation.
8.4 Information exchanges protection199





Information dissemination within the receiving
member should be limited, based on





Each information exchange should begin with
a disclaimer, listing any special requirements





Each information exchange should indicate
the originator’s degree of confidence in the
transmitted information’s credibility and
accuracy.
197ISO/IEC 27017:2015 (n 192) p. 8.
198ibid p. 7.







The originator of an information exchange
should indicate if the sensitivity of the
information supplied will reduce after some




A community member should remove any
source identification information in any
communication it originates or receives





With the approval of the originator, members
of a community should be able to receive





Unless it is marked for wider release,
information should not be distributed beyond
the information sharing community without
formal approval from the originator.
9 Access control
9.1 Business requirements of access control




An access control policy shall be established,
documented and reviewed based on business





Users shall only be provided with access to
the network and network services that they
have been specifically authorized to use.
9.2 User access management






A formal user registration and de-registration
process shall be implemented to enable






A formal user access provisioning process
shall be implemented to assign or revoke
access rights for all user types to all systems
and services.
The cloud service provider should provide
functions for managing the access rights of
the cloud service customer’s cloud service






The allocation and use of privileged access







The allocation of secret authentication
information shall be controlled through a
formal management process.
...it should be noted that time pressures
found in health delivery situations can make
effective use of passwords difficult to employ.
Many health organizations have considered
the adoption of alternative authentication
technologies to address this problem.201
9.2.5 Review of user
access rights
Control
Asset owners shall review users’ access





The access rights of all employees and
external party users to information and
information processing facilities shall be
removed upon termination of their
employment, contract or agreement, or
adjusted upon change.
9.3 User responsibilities
Objective: To make users accountable for safeguarding their authentication information.




Users shall be required to follow the
organization’s practices in the use of secret
authentication information.
9.4 System and application access control
Objective: To prevent unauthorized access to systems and applications.
200ISO/IEC 27017:2015 (n 192) p. 9.






Access to information and application system
functions shall be restricted in accordance
with the access control policy.
The cloud service customer should ensure
that access to information in the cloud
service can be restricted in accordance with
its access control policy and that such
restrictions are realized.202
The cloud service provider should provide
access controls that allow the cloud service
customer to restrict access to its cloud
services, its cloud service functions and the





Where required by the access control policy,
access to systems and applications shall be





Password management systems shall be
interactive and shall ensure quality
passwords.
9.4.4 Use of privileged
utility programs
Control
The use of utility programs that might be
capable of overriding system and application
controls shall be restricted and tightly
controlled.








Objective: To ensure proper and effective use of cryptography to protect the confidentiality,
authenticity and/or integrity of information.








A policy on the use of cryptographic controls
for protection of information shall be
developed and implemented.
Cryptographic techniques can also be used
to implement the dissemination rules of
information sharing.204
10.1.2 Key management Control
A policy on the use, protection and lifetime of
cryptographic keys shall be developed and
implemented through their whole lifecycle.
12 Operations security
12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities





Operating procedures shall be documented





Changes to the organization, business
processes, information processing facilities
and systems that affect information security
shall be controlled.
The cloud service provider should provide the
cloud service customer with information
regarding changes to the cloud service that




The use of resources shall be monitored,
tuned and projections made of future
capacity requirements to ensure the required
system performance.
The cloud service provider should monitor
the total resource capacity to prevent
information security incidents caused by
resource shortages.206
204ISO/IEC 27010:2015 (n 54) p. 9.










Development, testing, and operational
environments shall be separated to reduce
the risks of unauthorized access of changes
to the operational environment.
Where the use of PII for testing purposes
cannot be avoided a risk assessment should
be undertaken.207
12.3 Backup




Backup copies of information, software and
system images shall be taken and tested
regularly in accordance with an agreed
backup policy.
Information processing systems based on the
cloud computing model introduce additional
or alternative mechanisms to off-site backups
for protecting against loss of data, ensuring
continuity of data processing operations, and
providing the ability to restore data
processing operations after a disruptive
event.208
PII-specific responsibilities in this respect can
lie with the cloud service customer.209
12.4 Logging and monitoring
Objective: To record events and generate evidence.
207ISO/IEC 27018:2019: Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for protection of
personally identifiable information (PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors (2019) p. 10.




12.4.1 Event logging Control
Event logs recording user activities,
exceptions, faults and information security
events shall be produced, kept and regularly
reviewed.
When required by the information sharing
community, members should log the internal
dissemination of shared information.210
The cloud service provider should provide
logging capabilities to the cloud service
customer.211
Where possible, event logs should record
whether or not PII has been changed as a
result of an event and by whom.212
12.4.2 Protection of log
information
Control
Logging facilities and log information shall be
protected against tampering and authorized
access.
A procedure, preferably automatic, should be
put in place to ensure that logged information





System administrator and system operator
activities shall be logged and the logs




The clocks of all relevant information
processing systems within an organization or
security domain shall be synchronised to a
single reference time source.
The cloud service provider should provide
information to the cloud service customer
regarding the clock used by the cloud service
provider’s systems, and information about
how the cloud service customer can
synchronize local clocks with the cloud
service clock.214
210ISO/IEC 27010:2015 (n 54) p. 10.
211ISO/IEC 27017:2015 (n 192) p. 15.
212ISO/IEC 27018:2019 (n 207) p. 11.
213ibid p. 11.






The cloud service customer should have the
capability to monitor specified aspects of the
operation of the cloud services that the cloud
service customer uses.215
12.6 Technical vulnerability management





Information about technical vulnerabilities or
information systems being used shall be
obtained in a timely fashion, the
organization’s exposure to such
vulnerabilities evaluated and appropriate
measures taken to address the associated
risk.
The cloud service provider should make
available to the cloud service customer
information about the management of
technical vulnerabilities that can affect the
cloud services provided.216
12.7 Information systems audit considerations





Audit requirements and activities involving
verification of operational systems shall be
carefully planned and agreed to minimise




Every information sharing community should
specify the rights of members to audit the
systems of other members and of any trusted
service providers.
13 Communications security
13.1 Network security management
Objective: To ensure the protection of information in networks and its supporting
information processing facilities.
13.1.1 Network controls Control
Networks shall be managed and controlled to
protect information in systems and
applications.
215ISO/IEC 27017:2015 (n 192) p. 27.
216ibid p. 16.






Security mechanisms, service levels and
management requirements of all network
services shall be identified and included in
network services agreements, whether these





Groups of information services, users and
information systems shall be segregated on
networks.
The cloud service provider should enforce
segregation of network access for the
following cases: segregation between tenants
in a multi-tenant environment; [and]
segregation between the cloud service
provider’s internal administration environment
and the cloud service customer’s cloud
computing environment.218
Where appropriate, the cloud service
provider should help the cloud service
customer verify the segregation implemented
by the cloud service provider.219
13.2 Information transfer
Objective: To maintain the security of information transferred within an organization and





Formal transfer policies, procedures and
controls shall be in place to protect the
transfer of information through the use of all





Agreements shall address the secure transfer
of business information between the
organization and external parties.
All information sharing communities should
define information transfer agreements, and
should only permit members to join the
community if such agreements are signed
and accepted.220
218ISO/IEC 27017:2015 (n 192) p. 17.
219ibid p. 17.






Information involved in electronic messaging
shall be appropriately protected.
All information sharing communities should
define rules for the protection of information
in transit, and only permit members to join
the community if such rules are accepted and
implemented by the prospective member.
Any supporting entity should implement such
rules internally.221
Information sharing communities should
consider implementing alternative
mechanisms for information sharing that do
not rely on electronic messaging, and
enabling members to specify that specific






Requirements for confidentiality or
non-disclosure agreements reflecting the
organization’s needs for the protection of
information shall be identified, regularly
reviewed and documented.
14 System acquisition, development and maintenance
14.1 Security requirements of information systems
Objective: To ensure that information security is an integral part of information systems
across the entire lifecycle. This also includes the requirements for information systems







The information security related requirements
shall be included in the requirements for new







Information involved in application services
passing over public networks shall be
protected from fraudulent activity, contract
dispute and unauthorized disclosure and
modification.









Information involved in application service




message duplication or replay.
14.2 Security in development and support processes
Objective: To ensure that information security is designed and implemented within the





Rules for the development of software and
systems shall be established and applied to





Changes to systems within the development
lifecycle shall be controlled by the use of






When operating platforms are changed,
business critical applications shall be
reviewed and tested to ensure there is no







Modifications to software packages shall be
discouraged, limited to necessary changes





Principles for engineering secure systems
shall be established, documented,






Organizations shall establish and
appropriately protect secure development
environments for system development and





The organization shall supervise and monitor







Testing of security functionality shall be





Acceptance testing programs and related
criteria shall be established for new
information systems, upgrades and new
versions.
14.3 Test data
Objective: To ensure the protection of data used for testing.
14.3.1 Protection of test
data
Control
Test data shall be selected carefully,
protected and controlled.
15 Supplier relationships
15.1 Information security in supplier relationships






Information security requirements for
mitigating the risks associated with supplier’s
access to the organization’s assets shall be
agreed with the supplier and documented.
The cloud service customer should include
the cloud service provider as a type of







All relevant information security requirements
shall be established and agreed with each
supplier that may access, process, store,
communicate, or provide IT infrastructure
components for, the organization’s
information.
All community members should be made
aware of the identities of all third parties
involved in the provision of community
services, in case they have objections to
particular parties being involved in the
handling of information they provide.224
223ISO/IEC 27017:2015 (n 192) p. 19.








Agreements with suppliers shall include
requirements to address the information
security risks associated with information and
communications technology services and
product the supply chain.
15.2 Supplier service delivery management






Organizations shall regularly monitor, review
and audit supplier service delivery.
16 Information security incident management
16.1 Management of information security incidents and improvements
Objective: To ensure a consistent and effective approach to the management of





Management responsibilities and procedures
shall be established to ensure a quick,
effective and orderly response to information
security incidents.
An information security incident should
trigger a review by the public cloud PII
processor, as part of its information security
management process, to determine if a data
breach involving PII has taken place.225







Information security events shall be reported
through appropriate management channels
as quickly as possible.
Members of an information sharing
community should consider whether detected
events should be reported to other members
of the community. The community should
agree and publish guidance on the types of
incident that will be of interest to other
members.226
The cloud service provider should provide
mechanisms for: the cloud service customer
to report an information security event to the
cloud service provider; the cloud service
provider to report an information security
event to a cloud service customer; [and] the
cloud service customer to track the status of






Employees and contractors using the
organization’s information systems and
services shall be required to note and report
any observed or suspected information
security weaknesses in systems or services.





Information security events shall be assessed
and it shall be decided if they are to be





Information security incidents shall be
responded to in accordance with the
documented procedures.
226ISO/IEC 27010:2015 (n 54) p. 12.







Knowledge gained from analysing and
resolving information security incidents shall
be used to reduce the likelihood or impact of
future incidents.
Investigations based on information
distributed by an information sharing
community should be performed, to reduce
the risks of similar incidents and develop a
better understanding of the risks facing the





The organization shall define and apply
procedures for the identification, collection,
acquisition and preservation of information,




An early warning system should be deployed
within the information sharing community to
effectively communicate priority information
as soon as it is available.
17 Information security aspects of business continuity management
17.1 Information security continuity






The organization shall determine its
requirements for information security and the
continuity of information security
management in adverse situations, e.g.





The organization shall establish, document,
implement and maintain processes,
procedures and controls to ensure the
required level of continuity for information
security during an adverse situation.









The organization shall verify the established
and implemented information security
continuity controls at regular intervals in order
to ensure that they are valid and effective
during adverse situations.
17.2 Redundancies






Information processing facilities shall be
implemented with redundancy sufficient to
meet availability requirements.
18 Compliance
18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements
Objective: To avoid breaches of legal, statutory, regulatory or contractual obligations related







All relevant legislative statutory, regulatory,
contractual requirements and the
organization’s approach to meet these
requirements shall be explicitly identified,
documented and kept up to date for each
information system and the organization.
The information sharing community should
take due account of any relevant agreements,
laws and regulations relating to information
sharing, such as anti-cartel legislation or
regulations. This could prevent certain
organizations joining the community, or place




Appropriate procedures shall be implemented
to ensure compliance with legislative,
regulatory and contractual requirements
related to intellectual property rights and use
of proprietary software products.
The cloud service provider should establish a
process for responding to intellectual
property rights complaints.231
230ISO/IEC 27010:2015 (n 54) p. 14.






Records shall be protected from loss,
destruction, falsification, unauthorized access
and unauthorized release, in accordance with








Privacy and protection of personally
identifiable information shall be ensured as






Cryptographic controls shall be used in
compliance with all relevant agreements,
legislation and regulations.





Liability issues and remediation should be
clarified, understood and approved by all
members of an information sharing
community, to address situations in which
information is intentionally or unintentionally
disclosed.
18.2 Information security reviews
Objective: To ensure that information security is implemented and operated in accordance






The organization’s approach to managing
information security and its implementation
(i.e. control objectives, controls, policies,
processes and procedures for information
security) shall be reviewed independently at






Managers shall regularly review the
compliance of information processing and
procedures within their area of responsibility
with the appropriate security policies,
standards and any other security
requirements.







Information systems shall be regularly
reviewed for compliance with the
organization’s information security policies
and standard.
The additional controls introduced by ISO/IEC 27018 are classified according to the eleven
privacy principles of ISO/IEC 29100, rather than the eighteen clauses of ISO/IEC 27002.
The relevant controls are reproduced below—all controls are from Annex A of the ISO/IEC
27018 standard.
P11 Information security




The creation of hardcopy material displaying
PII should be restricted.






PII that is transmitted over public
data-transmission networks should be
encrypted prior to transmission.
P11.8 Unique use of
user ID
Control
If more than one individual has access to
stored PII, then they should each have a
distinct user ID for identification,




An up-to-date record of the users or profiles
of users who have authorized access to the




De-activated or expired user IDs should not
be granted to other individuals.
Table 1: ISO/IEC 27000-series controls applicable to
TIMS
B ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207 Processes
This appendix details all of the processes listed in the ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2017 standard,
their stated purposes and the list of activities required to fulfil each. Within the standard,
each activity is broken down into various tasks; for example, the 6.4.3 Decision Manage-
ment process has the activity ‘make and manage decisions’, which is broken down into the
following tasks:
a) Determine preferred alternative for each decision.
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b) Record the resolution, decision rational, and assumptions.
c) Record, track, evaluate and report decisions.233
Tasks have here been elided for brevity, but are vital for successfully completing each activity.
All text below is from § 6 of the ISO/IEC/IEEE 12207:2017 standard.




To obtain a product or
service in accordance with
the acquirer’s
requirements.
Prepare for the acquisition.
Advertise the acquisition and
select the supplier.
Establish and maintain an
agreement. Monitor the
agreement.
Accept the product or
service.
6.1.2 Supply process To provide an acquirer with
a product or service that
meets agreed
requirements.
Prepare for the supply.
Respond to a request for
supply of products or
services.
Establish and maintain an
agreement.
Execute the agreement.
Deliver and support the
product or service.
6.2 Organizational Project-Enabling processes
6.2.1 Life Cycle Model
Management
process




models and procedures for
use by the organisation
with respect to the scope






















To initiate and sustain
necessary, sufficient and












To provide the organization
with necessary human


























To create the capability












6.3 Technical Management processes
6.3.1 Project Planning
process










To assess if the plans are
aligned and feasible;
determine the status of the
project; and direct
execution to help ensure
that the performance is
according to plans and
schedules.













evaluating a set of








To identify, analyse, treat
and monitor the risks
continually.
Plan risk management.







To manage and control
system elements and


























To collect, analyse and
report objective data and
information to support
effective management and
demonstrate the quality of







To help ensure the






Perform product or service
evaluations.
Perform process evaluations.










To define the business or
mission problem or
opportunity, characterise
the solution space and
determine potential
solutions.
Prepare for business or
mission analysis.












To define the stakeholder
requirements for a system
that can provide the
capabilities needed by
users and other






















view of desired capabilities
into a technical view of a
solution that meets the














select one or more and to






Develop models and views of
candidate architectures.
















defined in models and
views of the system
architecture.
Prepare for software system
design definition.









To provide a rigorous basis




Define the system analysis
strategy and prepare for
system analysis.
Perform system analysis.
Manage the system analysis.
6.4.7 Implementation
process








To synthesize a set of












evidence that a system or







6.4.10 Transition process To establish a capability for





Prepare for the software
system transition.
Perform the transition.




evidence that the system,





















To sustain the capability of







6.4.14 Disposal process To end the existence of a
system element or system,
appropriately handle
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